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THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
by
Camden Hutchison*
ABSTRACT
This Article uses historical evidence to trace the debtequity distinction’s origins, development, and continuing
evolution. Citing legislative history, business lobbying efforts,
and important changes in the broader historical context, this
Article argues that the disparate treatment of debt and equity
was never a conscious policy goal, but was rather the
unintended outcome of an extended series of short-term
political decisions. These political decisions were historically
specific—i.e., formulated in response to temporary historical
contingencies—but had consequences that have persisted to
the present day. The Article concludes by assessing the
broader implications of this history for both the current
structure of the U.S. tax system and the prospects of future tax
reform.
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INTRODUCTION

Few aspects of U.S. tax law have received greater criticism—and
attracted fewer defenders—than the long-standing distinction between debt
and equity.1 This feature of the tax system allows corporations to deduct
interest paid on debt, but not dividends paid to shareholders, from the amount
of profits on which federal income tax is calculated. Other things being equal,
the effect of this distinction is to reduce the after-tax cost of debt financing
relative to equity financing, thus making it less expensive for corporations to
borrow money than to issue shares. Many economists believe this policy
encourages corporations to substitute debt for equity, distorting the capital
structure outcomes that would otherwise obtain in perfect financial markets.2
Legal scholars have argued that while tax law attempts to draw a bright line
between debt and equity, the distinction lacks a compelling theoretical
justification, is difficult to draw in practice, and invites tax avoidance
strategies.3 Critics in the financial and popular press have portrayed the debt1. For purposes of this Article, “debt” refers to the usual means by which
corporations borrow money, including loans, bonds, and commercial paper, while
“equity” refers to capital stock. “Interest” refers to compensation for borrowed money
that is typically paid to debtholders, while “dividends” refers to distributions of
corporate income that are typically paid to stockholders. As discussed in this Article,
the practical and legal distinctions among debt and equity are often problematic.
2. For a review of the relevant economic literature, see John R. Graham,
A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS FINANCE 573, 576–
600 (2006) [hereinafter Graham, A Review of Taxes].
3. For perhaps the most well-known critique of the U.S. tax law’s
treatment of corporate debt, see William T. Plumb. Jr., The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV.
369 (1971) [hereinafter Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt]. For subsequent commentary on the issue, see Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with
a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and
the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1228–37, 1257–73 (2010)
[hereinafter Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code]; Katherine Pratt, The DebtEquity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1055–93 (2000)
[hereinafter Pratt, Second-Best World]; Adam Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid
Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 118, 133–42 (1985) [hereinafter Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments]. See also
Joseph Allen, Note, Seeking True Financial Reform: Ending the Debt-Equity
Distinction, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243 (2012) [hereinafter Allen, Seeking True
Financial Reform]. Although the term “debt-equity distinction” did not enter
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equity distinction as an aggravating factor in the 2008 financial crisis, claiming
that interest deductibility encourages excessive leverage.4 In light of
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s past leadership of Bain
Capital, a private equity firm known for engaging in high-leverage acquisition
strategies, interest deductibility even emerged as an issue in the 2012
presidential race.5 Recently, the Obama Administration proposed reducing the
tax advantage of debt by limiting the ability of corporations to deduct interest
from taxable income.6 Few observers anticipate significant change, however,
widespread usage until the late 1960s, earlier scholars recognized the problem, which
they often discussed under the rubric of “thin incorporation” or “thin capitalization.”
See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES
830 (1956); Mortimer Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ.
L. REV. 31 (1959); William M. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders:
“Thin Capitalization” and Related Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1 (1960); Harry K.
Mansfield, Thin Incorporation, 40 A.B.A. J. 237 (1954); M. R. Schlesinger, “Thin”
Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1947);
Martin Kurzer, Comment, Thin Incorporation: A Continuing Problem, 51 MARQ. L.
REV. 158 (1967); Note, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 COLUM. L. REV.
1054 (1955); Note, Thin Incorporation: The Major Tests of Debt or Equity Financing,
1959 WASH. U. L. Q. 433 (1959).
4. See, e.g., David Cho, Look at Macy’s: Why Companies Can’t Resist:
U.S. Tax Code Encourages Them to Rack Up Huge Debt, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010;
Jesse Eisinger, Distortion in Tax Code Makes Debt More Attractive to Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 20, 2012, at B4; Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed, A Recipe for Cutting Corporate
Taxes, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2012; Felix Salmon, How to Reduce the Deductibility of
Interest Payments, REUTERS BLOG, Feb. 23, 2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2012/02/23/how-to-reduce-the-deductibility-of-interest-payments/; Editorial,
Reform and Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at A26 [hereinafter NYT
Editorial, Reform and Corporate Taxes]. See also Allen, Seeking True Financial
Reform, supra note 3.
5. See William D. Cohan, Private Equity’s Public Subsidy Is a Tragedy:
William D. Cohan, BLOOMBERGVIEW, Jan. 22 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-01-23/private-equity-s-public-subsidy-is-a-tragedy-william-dcohan.html; Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gains,
Jul.
15,
2012,
Socialized
Losses,
BLOOMBERGVIEW,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yielded-private-gains-socialized-losses.html;
James
Surowiecki, Private Inequity, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012; cf. Josh Barro, Good
Leverage, Bad Leverage and Bain, BLOOMBERGVIEW Jul. 17, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-17/good-leverage-bad-leverage-andbain.html.
6. J. REP. BY WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 5–6, 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S
BUSINESS TAX REFORM]. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee have also considered limiting interest deductibility. James Politi,
Congress Weighs Corporate Debt Tax Reform, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013. These
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given the well-known difficulty of fundamental tax reform.7
This widespread criticism presents a puzzle. If economists, legal
scholars, and other tax commentators are in broad agreement that the
distinction is unsound, then why does it exist? In other words, how and why
did U.S. tax law come to embody a principle that tax policy experts reject?
proposals follow earlier efforts by the Bush Administration: the capital gains and
dividend tax reductions included in the controversial “Bush tax cuts,” for example,
were intended in part to mitigate the tax advantage of debt. See Press Release, White
House Office of the Press Secr’y, President Discusses Taking Action to Strengthen
America’s Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2003/01/20030107-5.html. See also Tax Reform and the Treatment of
Debt and Equity: J. Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means and S. Fin. Comm.,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Pamela F. Olson). The Bush-era capital gains and
dividend reductions were partially repealed effective January 1, 2013 amidst the
federal budget crisis. Under these most recent changes enacted by the Obama
Administration, taxation of capital gains and dividends increased from 15 percent to
20 percent for individuals earning more than $400,000 (or married couples earning
more than $450,000) annually. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-240, § 101(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. 2313, 2315–2316 (2013). In addition, for
individuals earning more than $200,000 (or married couples earning more than
$250,000) annually, capital gains and dividends are now subject to a 3.8 percent surtax
under the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act raising the maximum rate on
investment income to 23.8 percent; this act along with the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act are popularly referred to as “Obamacare”. Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1029,
1060–61; see Jeff Benjamin, Deal on Dividend Tax Is Small Victory for Investors,
INVESTMENTNEWS, Jan. 6, 2013, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130106/
REG/301069988/deal-on-dividend-tax-is-small-victory-for-investors; Tony Nitti,
Obamacare Investment Income: A Downloadable Cheat Sheet, FORBES, Jan. 6, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2012/12/06/cheat-sheets-to-the-obamacareinvestment-income-tax-regulations-a-downloadable-pdf/; Hibah Yousuf, Dividend
Tax Hike ‘Could Have Been Worse,’ CNNMONEY, Jan. 2, 2013,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/02/investing/fiscal-cliff-dividend-tax-rate/.
Additionally, the Obama Administration’s proposals to directly limit interest
deductibility echo the suggestions of several tax commentators. See generally Lucas
W. Goodman & Robert C. Pozen, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest
Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207 (Dec. 10, 2012); Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate
Meltdowns and the Deduction of Credit-Risk Interest, 131 TAX NOTES 513 (May 2,
2011); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Treat Corporate Interest Deductions
Like Any Tax Expenditure, 136 TAX NOTES 631 (Aug. 6, 2012).
7. See Ezra Klein, Tax Reform Is Really, Really Hard, WASH. POST BLOG,
Feb 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/10/taxreform-is-going-to-be-really-really-hard/; Daniel Shaviro, How Would the
“President’s Framework for Corporate Tax Reform” Pay for Cutting the Corporate
MAKING
SENSE
BLOG
(Feb.
23,
2012),
Rate?
START
http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2012/02/how-would-presidents-framework-for.html;
NYT Editorial, Reform and Corporate Taxes, supra note 4.
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Was the favorable treatment of debt a product of the political influence of
business and financial interests? Was the unfavorable treatment of equity due
to equalitarian efforts to redistribute wealth? Did the distinction necessarily
result from any specific political agenda? Is it even possible to pinpoint exactly
when and how the distinction first arose?
In general, existing scholarship has not addressed these questions.
Although the debt-equity distinction has been the focus of considerable
academic attention, few policy-oriented scholars have examined the issue’s
history.8 Economists, reflecting their disciplinary training and expertise, tend
to evaluate policies as givens, rather than considering their historical contexts.
Economic studies of the debt-equity distinction have therefore focused on its
effects rather than its causes.9 Applied policy research produced by the federal
government and other nonacademic institutions is particularly ahistorical—
many of these sources recommend reform, but provide no insight into why the
current system exists.10 For their part, legal scholars have taken a greater
interest in the political aspects of the distinction, but they have generally
focused on its contemporary persistence, without accounting for its historical
8. This is despite recognition that history matters for understanding
current policy structures. Ilan Benshalom, for example, has suggested that better
appreciation of the origins of tax rules could lead to better contemporary policy
analysis. Regarding the debt-equity distinction, he describes the current state of affairs
as follows:
Arbitrary distinctions, such as the debt-equity distinction, have little
if any justification for why they should be enforced but for the fact
that they are “in the Code.” With this type of shaky why, it is no
wonder that practitioners devote most of their time to questions of
how, while academics find it more attractive to solve abstract
problems with intellectually “cleaner” solutions.
Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code, supra note 3.
9. This characterization applies to the vast majority of economic
scholarship on the issue, much of which is technical in nature. For a review of the
literature, see Graham, A Review of Taxes, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S BUSINESS TAX REFORM, supra note 6; RUUD A.
DE MOOIJ, INTL. MONETARY FUND, TAX BIASES TO DEBT FINANCE: ASSESSING THE
PROBLEM, FINDING SOLUTIONS (2011); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-41-11,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS DEBT
(2011); DEP’T OF TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007); ; OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007); THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX
REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX
SYSTEM (2005); Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm & Victoria Perry, Tax and the
Crisis, 31 FISC. STUD. 43 (2010).
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origins.11 Such causal explanations as do exist in the literature rely more on
reasoned speculation than empirical evidence. Jennifer Arlen and Deborah
Weiss, for example, have suggested that lobbying by financial companies may
explain the existence of interest deductibility.12 Barry Adler has written that
interest deductibility may be the result of lobbying more generally, with the
tacit approval of the taxpaying public.13 Katherine Pratt has ascribed the debtequity distinction to a historical, individualistic conception of debtor-creditor
relations, under which interest was considered a legitimate business expense,
but dividend payments were not.14 Given their focus on contemporary policy
issues, none of these authors support their explanations with primary historical
evidence.
This Article takes a different approach. Rather than conducting a
normative assessment of the debt-equity distinction as it exists today, it seeks
to explain how and why the distinction became law in the first place.
Answering this question represents an important contribution to the literature,
as no scholar of any discipline has provided an adequate account of the
policy’s origins. Indeed, if tax scholars are guilty of neglecting history,
historians are equally guilty of neglecting taxes—few historians have written
on fiscal history, and fewer still have delved into the specific details of tax

11. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of
Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995) [hereinafter Arlen & Weiss, A Political
Theory] for a commonly cited analysis of the contemporary politics of the debt-equity
distinction. See also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 345–46 (1993) [hereinafter Adler,
American Corporate Bankruptcy]; Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code, supra
note 3, at 1238–45; Yariv Brauner, Integration in an Integrating World, 2 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 51, 53 n.12 (2005); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the
Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 528–35 (2009); Anthony P. Polito,
Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach, 55 S.C. L. REV.
1, 34–36 (2003). Articles address the debt-equity distinction’s history rarely devote
more than a few pages to the discussion of its history. See, e.g., Benshalom, How to
Live with a Tax Code, supra note 3, at 1240–43; Curtis Jay Berger, Simple Interest
and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 218–22 (1981) [hereinafter Berger,
Simple Interest]; Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 3, at 121–28; Jeffrey L.
Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68
N.C. L. REV. 613, 618–20 (1990) [hereinafter Kwall, The Uncertain Case]; Pratt,
Second-Best World, supra note 3, at 1094–98; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate
Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1585–86 (1974)
[hereinafter Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction].
12. Arlen & Weiss, A Political Theory, supra note 11, at 354 n.163.
13. Adler, American Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 346.
14. Pratt, Second-Best World, supra note 3, at 1065–67.
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law.15 The result of this neglect is that the origins of many long-standing tax
principles, including the debt-equity distinction, are poorly understood.
An important exception is the work of Steven Bank, who has written
extensively on the history of corporate tax law. Of particular significance is
Bank’s work on the rise of “double taxation”—the feature of U.S. tax law by
which corporate profits are taxed at both the corporate and individual
shareholder levels.16 Since dividend payments, unlike interest, are not
deductible by corporations for tax purposes, double taxation can be thought of
as the equity side of the debt-equity distinction.17 Bank’s work in this area has
been an important influence on my own research, and indeed, this Article
supports many of his findings.
My contribution is distinct from Bank’s in important respects,
however. Most significantly, I redirect attention to the origins of interest
deductibility, while Bank’s work has emphasized the tax treatment of equity.
I also rely somewhat less than Bank on the agency theory framework of
corporate governance scholarship. Finally, I pay greater attention to how
changes in the historical context, including broad shifts in the American
political landscape, transformative economic developments, and unanticipated
fiscal crises (such as war, depression, and other exogenous fiscal shocks),
imposed a wide array of shifting and often contradictory pressures on U.S. tax
policy.
Specifically, this Article argues that the debt-equity distinction is the
unintended consequence of an extended series of discrete, reactive, short-term
political decisions, rather than the intentional realization of any broader policy
goal. Each such decision was influenced by prior decisions, imparting a
15. Among current historians of taxation, W. Elliot Brownlee and Joseph
Thorndike are perhaps the most prominent. While valuable, their work has generally
focused on broad policy developments rather than specific legal rules. See, e.g., W.
ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed.
2004) [hereinafter BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY]; FUNDING THE MODERN
AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE,
(W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE, (Joseph J.
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry eds., 2002); JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE:
TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR (2013).
16. See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010) [hereinafter BANK, SWORD
TO SHIELD]; Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash Over the Control
of Corporate Earnings, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 153 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J.
Stark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bank, The Story of Double Taxation]; Steven A. Bank,
Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 167 (2002) [hereinafter Bank, Corporate Managers].
17. Bank has also addressed the debt side of the distinction in a recent
symposium essay. See Steven A. Bank, Historical Perspective on the Corporate
Interest Deduction, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 29 (2014).
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distinctly path-dependent character to the process’s eventual outcome. Due to
the significant inertia of tax policy, decisions made in response to specific
historical circumstances became difficult to change—even after the
circumstances themselves changed or were no longer relevant. Through an
essentially undirected process, the debt-equity distinction became an
important feature of U.S. tax law without ever representing a coherent policy
objective. As discussed in the conclusion, this process has important
implications for our present understanding of the diverse and often contingent
forces that have shaped the U.S. tax system.
This Article begins with the Civil War and the enactment of the first
U.S. income tax and concludes with the establishment of full double taxation
of dividends in the late 1930s. This roughly 80-year period encompasses the
debt-equity distinction’s origins and early development. Although the
distinction has persisted throughout the postwar era, I have limited the scope
of my analysis to the distinction’s formative years, as its more recent history
has already received considerable attention in the legal literature. My focus
throughout is on the legislative politics that led to specific statutory
developments, as well as the social and economic contexts that shaped the
broader legislative agenda.18
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II addresses the temporary
income taxes enacted in the nineteenth century, prior to the establishment of a
permanent federal income tax system. This part focuses in particular on the
emerging concept of net income and the attendant deductibility of business
expenses. Part III explores statutory developments from 1909 to 1939, the
period in which the debt-equity distinction became a permanent feature of U.S.
tax law. Spanning World War I and the Great Depression, these were the
formative years of U.S. corporate taxation. Part IV concludes, assessing the
broader significance of the debt-equity distinction’s history to the limits and
possibilities of American tax reform.
II.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS:
THE CIVIL WAR INCOME TAX AND THE INCOME TAX OF 1894
The United States government’s first permanent income tax—initially
imposed only on corporations—was enacted by Congress in 1909.19

18. By and large, this Article does not focus on judicial decisions. Since
many of the notable decisions in this area attempted to delineate debt from equity in
terms of a preexisting statutory distinction, the scope of this Article is limited to the
evolution of the statutes themselves in the interest of concision.
19. An Act to provide revenue, equalize duties and encourage the industries
of the United States, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–
17 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Act to provide revenue]. Although Congress characterized
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Following ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,20 which
specifically permitted income taxation without apportionment among the
states, Congress expanded the income tax to include personal income as
well.21 Income taxation, both corporate and personal, has been a cornerstone
of the U.S. tax system ever since, and many of the Internal Revenue Code’s
defining features can be traced to the legislation of the early twentieth century.
The first permanent income tax and the Sixteenth Amendment were
not the federal government’s first efforts at income taxation, however.
Congress had enacted income taxes twice before in American history.22 To
help finance the Civil War, Congress enacted an income tax for the first time
in 1861,23 which remained in effect with various modifications until its repeal
in 1871.24 Despite repeated calls for reinstatement, the federal government did
without an income tax until 1894, when a broad coalition of equalitarian
political interests were able to win its return.25 This victory was short-lived,
however, as the Supreme Court struck down the 1894 tax as unconstitutional
within a year of its enactment.26
Despite the gaps in time between the nineteenth-century income taxes
and the permanent system established in the period between 1909 and 1913,
these earlier laws established important precedents for the subsequent tax
this tax as a special excise tax on corporate profits, it was a corporate income tax for
all intents and purposes.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
21. An Act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue for the
Government, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 63-16, §§ II.A–F, 38 Stat. 114, 166–
71 (1913) [hereinafter 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue].
22. Several states, including North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Wisconsin, had also previously experimented with income taxation. As
of the enactment of the federal individual income tax in 1913, the only state income
tax of any significance was that of Wisconsin, enacted in 1911. EDWIN R. A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 388–429 (1911) [hereinafter SELIGMAN,
A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX]. The Wisconsin income tax, which became a model
for income taxes adopted in other states, was enacted as Act of Jul. 15, 1911, ch. 658,
1911 Wisc. Session Laws 984. Surprisingly, the 1911 Wisconsin tax does not appear
to have featured in the Congressional debates leading to the 1913 federal tax.
23. An Act to provide increased Revenue from Imports, to pay Interest on
the Public Debt, and for other Purposes, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (1861).
24. An Act to reduce internal Taxes, and for other Purposes, § 6, 16 Stat.
256, 257 (1870) provided that 1871 would be the final year of the income tax.
25. An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the government, and
for other purposes, §§ 27–33, 28 Stat. 509, 553–57 (1894).
26. As discussed infra, text at note 130, the Supreme Court struck down the
tax on the grounds that it violated the apportionment requirement of U.S. CONT. art.
1, § 2. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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treatment of debt and equity. Significantly, the nineteenth-century tax laws
occasioned Congress’s first engagement with what is perhaps the fundamental
conceptual problem of income taxation: What, exactly, is “income”? The
resolution of this question in the nineteenth century would establish the
framework for all future tax laws, conditioning the treatment of interest and
dividends under the twentieth-century corporate income tax.
A.

The Civil War Revenue Acts and the Meaning of Income

The Civil War gave rise to the federal government’s first experiments
with income taxation. Prior to the war, the government raised the majority of
its revenue through import tariffs.27 While sufficient to fund the national
government’s modest peacetime expenditures, tariffs were seen as inadequate
to meet the unprecedented cost of war mobilization.28 In addition, tariff
revenue was vulnerable to wartime disruptions to foreign trade, increasing the
importance of securing additional sources of government income.29
Republican legislators, who dominated both houses of the Union Congress,
believed a new tax based on individual income could help solve the North’s
sudden fiscal challenges. Together with tariff increases, excise taxes, and new
direct taxes on real property (apportioned among the states), the country’s first
income tax was adopted August 5, 1861.30
27. See F. W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
63133 (5th ed. 2010).
28. In the century and a half following the Civil War, federal spending as a
percentage of the U.S. economy has increased significantly. Federal spending as a
percentage of GDP was approximately 1.7 percent in 1859; the same figure was
approximately 20.8 percent in 2013. John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government
Finances—Revenue, Expenditure, and Debt: 17891939, table Ea584587 in
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT:
MILLENNIAL EDITION (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006); Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Table 15.3—Total Government Expenditures as Percentages of GDP: 1948–2013,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist15z3.xl
s (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). See also BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15,
at 31.
29. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note16, at 12; ROY G. BLAKEY &
GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2 (1940) [hereinafter BLAKEY &
BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX]; SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX,
supra note 22, at 430–34; JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67 (1985) [hereinafter WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT].
30. The revised tariffs, excise taxes, direct taxes, and income tax were all
included within 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23. As discussed infra Part
I.A, the 1861 income tax was never collected, being superseded by replacement
legislation in 1862. The Confederacy, facing a similar fiscal crisis, adopted its own
income tax in 1863. William D. Samson, The Nineteenth Century Income Tax in the
South, 12 ACCOUNT. HIST. J., Spring 1985, at 37, 44–48.

2015]

The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction

105

Unlike today, the Civil War income tax applied only to the income of
individuals, not the profits of corporations. Under the 1861 Act, the tax was to
be levied as 3 percent of the annual income, in excess of $800, of “every person
residing in the United States.”31 Corporations and other business entities were
not obligated to pay taxes on profits).32 Beginning in 1862, the government
levied a withholding tax equal to the individual income tax on interest and
dividends paid by businesses in certain industries. The income targeted by this
withholding tax was the income of individuals, not the profits of corporations
as entities separate from their investors.33 Corporations and other businesses
subject to the withholding tax merely served as collection points. At the time,
the perceived injustice of double taxation—taxing income at the corporate
level and then again at the individual level—was a sensitive political issue,
which Congress sought to avoid by allowing individual taxpayers to deduct
interest and dividends subject to the withholding tax from their personal

31. 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23, at § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309.
In subsequent years, the 3 percent rate would increase and the $800 exemption would
decrease. For comparison, the relative value of $800 in 1861 would be $21,800 in
2013, based on changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Seven Ways to Compute
the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present,
MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited
Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount]
32. For a summary of the 1861 Act’s key provisions, see infra Appendix
row 1.
33. An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government and to
pay Interest on the Public Debt, §§ 81–82, 12 Stat. 432, 469–70 (1862) [hereinafter
1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government] imposed a 3 percent
withholding tax on interest and dividends paid by transportation companies, as well
as on dividends (but not interest) paid by financial and insurance companies. An Act
to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, pay Interest on the Public
Debt, and for other Purposes, §§ 117, 120–22, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82, 283–85 (1864)
[hereinafter 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt]
allowed individual taxpayers to deduct interest and dividends subject to withholding
tax from their personal income, imposed individual income tax on certain business
profits, whether divided or otherwise, imposed a 5 percent withholding tax on interest
and dividends paid by transportation companies, and imposed a 5 percent withholding
tax on dividends (but not interest) paid by financial and insurance companies. See
BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 5; SELIGMAN, A
STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 444; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV.
1193, 1219–20 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, A Defense of the Corporate Tax]; cf.
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that although Congress
purposefully avoided double taxation, the Civil War tax laws planted the seeds of a
separate corporate income tax).
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income.34 This deduction was meant to ensure that taxes withheld from
interest and dividend payments were not duplicated when individual investors
filed their personal tax returns.35
Despite the absence of a separate corporate income tax, the Civil War
revenue acts had important consequences for the subsequent tax treatment of
corporate debt and equity. Congress’s experience with these early income tax
laws first gave rise to the concept of net income, inspiring the deduction
system familiar to us today. Since the tax distinction between debt and equity
is predicated on the existence of interest deductibility, the emergence of a net
conception of income was central to the distinction’s later development.
When the income tax was first enacted, the precise meaning of
“income” was unclear. Under the 1861 Act, the 3 percent tax applied to “the
annual income of every person residing in the United States, whether such
income is derived from any kind of property, or from any profession, trade,
employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere[.]”36 The
word “income” was not defined in the statute, however, and national, state,
and local taxes were the only specified deductions.37 This left considerable
ambiguity as to whether the law’s purpose was to tax gross income (all revenue
received by the taxpayer) or net income (revenue received by the taxpayer,
minus associated costs and expenses).
34. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473–74; 1864 Act to support the Government and pay
Interest on Public Debt, supra note 33, at § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82.
35. Integration of the withholding and individual-level taxes was imperfect,
however, in that the withholding tax was set at a flat rate that did not take into account
the standard personal exemption. This inconsistency was likely due to limitations in
the design and administration of the tax laws, rather than specific Congressional intent.
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 7–8. To illustrate the relative scale of
these taxes, in fiscal year 1864, the withholding tax on interest and dividends
amounted to $5,277,141.07, approximately 24 percent of all income tax revenues and
nearly 5 percent of internal revenue from all sources. In fiscal year 1865, withholding
tax on interest and dividends increased to $8,070,367.53, nearly 26 percent of all
income tax revenues and approximately 4 percent of internal revenue from all sources.
Withholding tax on interest and dividends represented a much larger percentage of
income tax revenues in fiscal year 1863—approximately 62 percent—as the
administrative infrastructure for collecting income tax directly from individuals was
not yet fully in place. See TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM FOR
THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1865 (1865); TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1864 (1864); TREASURY DEP’T,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1863 (1863).
36. 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23, at § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309.
37. Id
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The 1861 Congressional debates leading to the tax’s enactment
suggest that although certain deductions were implied, the exact scope of
allowable deductions was intentionally left unclear. Senator James Simmons,
a Republican from Rhode Island who introduced the tax bill in the Senate,
warned against what he considered the disadvantages of specifying
deductions. When questioned as to whether “income” meant gross or net
income for purposes of the tax bill, Simmons responded that “income” was
intended to mean “net profits,” but that specific determinations as to exactly
which expenses were or were not deductible were best left to the Treasury
Department, which was charged with the tax’s enforcement.38 According to
Simmons, express use of the term “net income” within the language of the
statute would open the door for taxpayers to claim spurious deductions.39
Referring to a hypothetical storehouse owner, Simmons explained:
If I put in the word “net” income, he would try to have
all the repairs, and so on, deducted, and would make them
amount to as much as the income. That would be the trouble.
When a man repairs his buildings, he will have less income
that year, because he spends it in repairing. I thought of
putting this word “net” in; but I could see so many ways of
evading it that I thought it better to let the Secretary of the
Treasury prescribe his rules, and let the bill cover all
incomes.40
Other Senators disagreed, feeling the meaning of the law should be as
clear as possible. For example, Senator Daniel Clark, a Republican from New
Hampshire, submitted an amendment to insert the word “net” before the word
“income,” but his proposal was voted down 18-10 in floor debate.41
Ultimately, Senator Simmons’s preference for ambiguity prevailed, as
reflected in the final language of the law. The meaning of income under the
1861 Act was never subjected to practical interpretation, however. In the first
of many revisions to the Civil War tax laws, a superseding revenue act was
signed July 1, 1862, before the 1861 Act was put in force.42
38. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1861).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The 1861 tax was to be payable June 30, 1862, but the Secretary of the
Treasury, Salmon Chase, advised that enforcement of the tax be deferred, as
“numerous questions will certainly perplex its assessment and collection.” SELIGMAN,
A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 435–36. The superseding 1862 tax
was enacted as 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government,
supra note 33.
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Under the 1862 Act, the income tax continued to apply to
individuals—“every person residing in the United States”—and was now
imposed at 3 percent of income exceeding $600 (unless the taxpayer’s income
exceeded $10,000, in which case the rate increased to 5 percent of income
exceeding $600).43 Presumably, the Act’s reference to “every person residing
in the United States” limited its application to individuals, although a separate
section of the act confused the matter by defining “person” to include
“partnerships, firms, associations, or corporations.”44 The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, charged with enforcing the tax, resolved this ambiguity by
determining that the income tax applied to individuals only.45 Although the
tax was not applied to corporations or other business entities as such, under
the 1862 Act, certain corporate interest and dividend payments became subject
to a 3 percent withholding tax.46 To avoid double taxation, these payments
were correspondingly deductible from the taxable income of individual
investors.47

43. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 90, 12 Stat. 432. For comparison, based on changes in the CPI, the relative
value of $600 in 1862 would be $14,300 in 2013, while the relative value of $10,000
would be $239,000. Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount, supra note 31.
Unlike the 1861 Act, which explicitly referred to an “income tax,” the corresponding
section of the 1862 Act referred instead to an income “duty.” Why Congress chose to
use the word “duty” in the 1862 version is unclear, but “duty” was changed back to
“tax” in 1867. An Act to amend existing Laws relating to Internal Revenue, and for
other Purposes, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 481–82 (1867) [hereinafter 1867 Act to amend
Laws relating to Internal Revenue].
44. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 68, 12 Stat. 432, 459–60. Although a literal reading of this section might
suggest that every reference to “person” in the 1862 Act included “partnerships, firms,
associations, or corporations,” the broader statutory framework would have made such
an interpretation difficult to sustain.
45. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following decision
in the spring of 1863: “The income tax is assessed upon the actual income of
individuals. Firms, as such, will not make returns.” Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No.
110, Relative to the assessment of the income tax (May 1863) reprinted in GEORGE
SEWALL BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 275 (1863) [hereinafter BOUTWELL, A MANUAL].
46. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at §§ 81–82, 12 Stat. 432, 469–70.
47. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473–74; see infra Appendix row 2. The salaries of federal
employees (including elected officials) also became subject to a 3 percent withholding
tax on amounts in excess of $600 and were fully deductible from such employees’
personal tax returns. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government,
supra note 33, at § 86, 12 Stat. 432, 472.
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For the most part, the phraseology of the 1861 Act was carried over to
the 1862 Act, with one significant difference: the 1862 Act replaced the term
“income” with the broader phrase “gains, profits, or income.”48 Although this
broader language more strongly suggested a net income concept, ambiguity
persisted, as reflected in the disagreement that characterized the 1862
legislative debates. Some members of Congress believed the meaning of
“gains, profits, or income” was self-evident, and that further elaboration would
only dilute the statute.49 Others argued that the meaning of “gains, profits, or
income” was ambiguous, and that express use of the words “net income” was
a necessary clarification.50 Although opponents of the term “net income”
claimed to agree, in principle, that taxpayers should be allowed to deduct
expenses from taxable income, such claims may have been disingenuous, as
opposition to the term seems to have been motivated largely by a desire to
limit deductions and thereby maximize revenue.51 For example, despite having
earlier acknowledged that “gains, profits, or income” meant net income,
Representative Justin Morrill, a Republican from Vermont, specifically
opposed the deductibility of mortgage interest.52
This issue of mortgage interest received particularly close attention
from Congress. By the 1860s, the westward expansion of American
agriculture was creating unprecedented growth in mortgage lending, as more
and more farmers purchased farmland with loans secured by the underlying
property.53 Mortgage loans were fast becoming one of the most common
forms of personal debt, and it is therefore unsurprising they featured
prominently in Congressional debates. Tellingly, some of the same lawmakers
who advocated a less precise definition of income also argued that mortgage
payments should not be allowable as deductions.54 As was often the case in
nineteenth-century tax politics, there appears to have been a regional cast to
these debates, with western agricultural states favoring interest deductibility
and wealthier northeastern states opposing it.55 In an exchange in the House
48. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
49. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531–32 (1862).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1531–32, 2486–87.
52. See id. at 1531–32.
53. For discussion of the nineteenth-century rise of the national mortgage
market, see Jonathan Levy, The Mortgage Worked the Hardest, in CAPITALISM TAKES
COMMAND: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 39
(Gary J. Kornblith & Michael Zakim eds., 2010).
54. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531–32 (1862).
55. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at
4; BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 46–47; SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF
THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 506–08, 520–21.
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of Representatives, Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois and
Representative Steven White of Indiana proposed an amendment specifying
that “income” meant “net income.” Representatives Justin Morrill of Vermont
and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania opposed the measure. Illustrating the
tensions between the western and northeastern states, Stevens criticized the
proposal in the following terms:
I oppose the amendment of the gentleman from
Indiana. The income tax, as a general rule, will be almost
exclusively collected from the large cities. The country, and
especially the western country, will not pay a millionth part
of it. If the present amendment prevails, they will not pay any
part of it.56
In addition to revealing regional frictions, these debates suggest that,
from the income tax’s earliest beginnings, some lawmakers were already
concerned with the use of deductions as an avoidance measure.
Other lawmakers also opposed inclusion of a specific mortgage
interest deduction, but for essentially the opposite reason—they believed the
phrase “gains, profits, or income” clearly entailed the deduction of mortgage
interest and feared specifying particular deductions might imply the
disallowance of others.57 Following a rather confused debate, the “gains,
profits, or income” phraseology (without the word “net”) prevailed in the
House, but not all representatives agreed that the final language was
sufficiently precise. Upon assurances from colleagues that “gains, profits, or
income” meant net income, an unsatisfied Lovejoy responded: “All I have to
say is, that some of the best lawyers in the House understand income to be the
gross income.”58
These disagreements notwithstanding, most members of Congress
probably did understand “gains, profits, or income” to mean net income, as
this was the meaning most often articulated in the official record. According
to Senator John Sherman, future Treasury Secretary and original sponsor of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the word “income” was widely understood to mean
net income, both as a practical and legal matter. Conceding that the word
“income” had not yet received definitive construction in American law,
Sherman argued that the term had a well-established meaning in commercial
practice and under the law of England, and that in both contexts, expenses—
56. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531 (1862). Representatives
Lovejoy, White, Morrill, and Stevens were all Republicans. Given the dominance of
the Republican Party, regional differences were often of greater political significance
than party differences.
57. Id. at 153132, 248687.
58. Id. at 1532.
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including interest—were always deducted to arrive at income.59 A
contemporary analysis of the 1862 Act in the Daily National Intelligencer
supported the “net income” interpretation. Citing dictionary definitions of the
words “gains,” “profits,” and “income,” the article concluded that while the
term “income” could be construed literally to mean all revenue that “comes
in,” the addition of the narrower terms “gains” and “profits” to form the phrase
“gains, profits, or income” weighed in favor of a net concept.60
Similar to the question of the meaning of the term “person,” the
ambiguity of “gains, profits, or income” was ultimately resolved at the
administrative level when the income tax was assessed and collected by the
newly formed Bureau of Internal Revenue. Faced with the practical problem
of how to measure taxable income, the Bureau chose to assess the tax on a net
basis. Its standard income tax return form, published and distributed for use
by taxpayers, explicitly provided for the deduction of business expenses,
maintenance expenses, insurance expenses, mortgage interest, and rent.61
Letter rulings issued by the Bureau in 1863 emphasized that “income tax is
laid upon the net gains, after the expenses of conducting the business are
deducted[,]”62 and that the rate of taxation was to be determined “after those
deductions are made, which are in actual diminution of income, such as rents,
taxes, repairs, losses, &c.”63 Moreover, an 1863 administrative decision of the
Bureau ruled that “[i]nterest on borrowed capital used in business” was also
deductible.64 Given the Bureau’s decisive construction of the law, the
ambiguity of the statute had little practical significance.
When Congress amended the income tax again in 1864, it followed
the Bureau’s lead by addressing deductions explicitly and providing that labor
costs, rent, and interest on mortgages were all deductible from taxable
income.65 Taxpayers could also deduct interest on general, unsecured debt, but
only up to the amount of interest they had received during the tax year.66 In
addition, the 1864 amendments increased the income tax to a graduated rate
of 5–10 percent and increased the withholding tax on corporate interest and

59. Id. at. 2487.
60. The Income Tax, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 27, 1862, at 2.
61. Form 24, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 155–
56.
62. Ruling 23, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 304.
63. Ruling 36, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 306.
64. Decision 110, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at
275.
65. 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt,
supra note 33, at § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82.
66. Id.
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dividends to 5 percent.67 Regarding deductions from income, it is not entirely
clear why––having avoided the issue in previous versions of the tax––
Congress chose to address deductions explicitly in 1864. The labor, rent, and
interest deductions were included in the 1864 House bill without comment and
were never amended (and apparently never discussed) as the bill moved
through Congress on its way to enactment.68 It seems likely that Congress was
simply conforming the law to the collection practice established by the Bureau,
but given the lack of legislative discussion, the exact reasons remain unknown.
Whatever the impetus, expense deductibility had now become an explicit
feature of statutory tax law.
The income tax remained in place following the conclusion of the
Civil War, and its structural details continued to evolve at both the statutory
and administrative levels. In 1867, Congress abandoned rate graduation and
changed the tax to a flat 5 percent rate on income exceeding $1,000.69 More
importantly, the interest deduction provision was substantially rewritten.
Under the 1867 amendments, general, unsecured business interest became
fully deductible, while the deductibility of non-business mortgage interest was
repealed.70 In effect, interest deductibility now depended on whether the
underlying debt was business-related, rather than on whether it was secured
by a lien. Following this amendment, the Bureau ceased its former practice of
allowing taxpayers to deduct interest on home mortgages.71
At the time, most interest-bearing debt in the American economy was,
in fact, business-related. Mortgage loans were issued primarily for the
purchase of farmland, which generated business income for tax purposes.

67. 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt,
supra note 33, at §§ 116, 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 283–84, 285–85; see infra
Appendix row 3.
68. H.R. 405, 38th Cong. (1864). The revenue bill passed the House by a
vote of 103-33 and the Senate by a vote of 28-3. The deduction provisions do not
appear to have been controversial, as I have found no discussion of them in
Congressional debates or contemporary news coverage. For vote count information,
see The Vote on the Tax Bill, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1864, at 2.
69. 1867 Act to amend Laws relating to Internal Revenue, at § 13, 14 Stat.
471, 477–80. For comparison, the relative value of $1,000 in 1867 would be $16,200
in 2013, based on changes in the CPI. Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount,
supra note 31.
70. 1867 Act to amend Laws relating to Internal Revenue, at § 13, 14 Stat.
471, 477–80.
71. OFFICE OF INTERNAL REVENUE, INSTRUCTIONS TO UNITED STATES
ASSESSORS: CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF INCOMES AND SPECIAL TAXES FOR
THE YEAR 1868, at 7 (1868); Mr. Delano on Taxation of Homestead Income, N.Y.
TIMES, March 28, 1870, at 1.
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Personal non-business lending was mainly limited to store credit.72
Nevertheless, homestead mortgage lending––mortgage lending secured by a
home, rather than farmland—which did not generate business income and was
therefore no longer deductible under the Bureau’s collection practices, had
become sufficiently widespread that the Bureau’s actions led to strong public
criticism.73 Editorials in major newspapers and periodicals condemned “the
weak and oppressive effort of the Internal Revenue Bureau to prohibit the
deduction of interest paid on mortgages,”74 castigated the Bureau’s policies as
lacking “justice or common sense,”75 and forewarned that “we are rapidly
drifting toward a despotism in this matter of the income tax.”76
Perhaps in response, Congressional amendments to the tax laws in
1870 eliminated any distinction between business and non-business interest,
allowing taxpayers to deduct “the amount of interest paid during the year”
without qualification.77 Strangely, the Bureau continued its practice of limiting
full interest deductibility to business debt. According to Bureau regulations,
interest on home mortgages and other non-business obligations was only
deductible up to the amount of interest income received, which for most
taxpayers meant not at all.78 This discrepancy between the statutory law and
its administrative enforcement highlights the confusion and ambiguity that
characterized the early income tax. It also illustrates the early conception of
interest as a business expense, an association that would continue to influence
later corporate tax policy.
In addition to addressing the treatment of interest, the 1870
amendments also provided for the income tax’s (temporary) repeal, limiting
the tax’s effectiveness to the year 1871 “and no longer.”79 In the years
following the conclusion of the war, the federal government’s fiscal situation
had begun to improve, budget deficits had turned to surpluses, and the income
72. See LOUIS HYMAN, BORROW: THE AMERICAN WAY

OF

DEBT 17–40

(2012).
73. See Income Tax Exemptions, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 24, 1870, at 8
[hereinafter Income Tax Exemptions]; Mortgagors and the Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1870 at 2; Reducing Taxes, MERCHS.’ MAG. & COMMERCIAL REV., Jan.–June
1870, at 420 [hereinafter Reducing Taxes]; The Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1870, at 3 [hereinafter The Income Tax]; The Income Tax and Interest on Mortgages,
N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 1870, at 2.
74. Reducing Taxes, supra note 73.
75. The Income Tax, supra note 73.
76. Income Tax Exemptions, supra note 73.
77. 1870 Act to reduce Taxes, supra note 24, at § 9, 16 Stat. 256, 258.
78. 7 I.R.R. 59, 11 I.R.R. 89, 11 I.R.R. 97, reprinted in ORLANDO F. BUMP,
INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS. INTERNAL REVENUE STATUTES NOW IN FORCE; WITH
NOTES REFERRING TO ALL DECISIONS OF THE COURT AND DEPARTMENTAL RULINGS,
CIRCULARS, AND INSTRUCTIONS, REPORTED TO OCTOBER 1, 1870, at 295–96 (1870).
79. 1870 Act to reduce Taxes, supra note 24, at § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
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tax—always unpopular—was no longer considered necessary.80 So ended the
federal government’s first experiment with income taxation, a revenue source
that would remain dormant until the Populist movement of the 1890s.
Although brief in duration, the Civil War income tax was of major importance
to subsequent tax law. Two of its developments in particular—the
establishment of a tax base grounded in the concept of net income and the
designation of interest as a deductible business expense—would eventually
become permanent features of the American tax system.
B.

The Income Tax of 1894 and the Advent of the Corporate Interest
Deduction

Following the Civil War, the government returned to its previous
reliance on import tariffs. Popular discontent with the tariff system would soon
emerge as a major political issue, however. The postwar nineteenth century
was a period of rapid economic development, but also of damaging financial
panics, growing labor unrest, and increasingly salient income inequality.81
Amidst these sweeping economic changes, the politically dominant
Republican Party’s tariff-centered fiscal policies drew increasing criticism.
Many voters perceived high tariffs on manufactured and other imported goods
as favoring northeastern industrial interests at the expense of American
consumers. Although indirect taxes such as tariffs are generally less visible
than direct taxes on income, U.S. tariffs were too high and too pervasive to
escape public notice. Since tariffs increased the prices of imported goods,
including basic necessities, and since the poor spent a greater proportion of
income on consumption than the wealthy, the postwar tax system was highly
regressive.82 Even consumers who avoided imported goods were effectively
80. SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 456–68.
81. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900, at 206–17 (2000) [hereinafter BENSEL, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY]; EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS,
LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1860–1897, at 1–12, 163–94, 356–81, 399–409 (1961);
GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860–1920 82–84 (3rd ed., 2006). For
recent work on nineteenth-century labor unrest, see generally THERESA A. CASE, THE
GREAT SOUTHWEST RAILROAD STRIKE AND FREE LABOR (2010); THE PULLMAN
STRIKE AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1890S: ESSAYS ON LABOR AND POLITICS (Nick
Salvatore et al. eds., 1999); THE GREAT STRIKES OF 1877 (David Omar Stowell ed.,
2008).
82. In modern economic parlance, a regressive tax system is one in which
a given taxpayer’s effective tax rate is inversely related to their ability to pay. In other
words, poor taxpayers face higher effective rates than wealthy taxpayers. At the time,
the tariff system was widely criticized as favoring the wealthy and disproportionately
burdening the poor. SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 454–
55. During the political debates leading to the 1894 income tax, Representative Benton
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taxed when they purchased competing domestic goods, the high prices of
which were supported by tariffs. In addition to taxing imports, Republican
fiscal policy also imposed high excise taxes on “sinful,” though highly
popular, consumer goods such as alcohol and tobacco.83 Serving as the
cornerstone of the Republican Party’s protectionist trade policy, these import
and consumption taxes effected a substantial wealth transfer from consumers
to producers.84
Popular dissatisfaction with tariff policy helped energize an
increasingly competitive Democratic party, which rose to challenge
Republican dominance in the 1880s and 1890s. Calls to reduce tariffs and
reinstate a progressive income tax converged with populist demands for trade
liberalization, restrictions on trusts, and an inflationary “free silver” monetary
policy—all spurred by economic disaffection and increasingly visible
concentrated wealth.85 Tax reform was a central plank of the Democratic Party
Platform of 1892, which cast Republican tariff policy as “the culminating
atrocity of class legislation.”86 The tariff issue helped Democrats win both
houses of Congress in the elections of 1892.87 Following the Democrats’
victory, any remaining political resistance to a new income tax was
undermined by the financial panic of 1893, which precipitated the worst
depression the United States had experienced to date.88 Amidst a climate of
McMillin of Tennessee summarized this view by stating that under the tariff system
“want, not wealth, pays the tax” and that an income tax would “put more tax upon
what men have, less on what they need.” Id. at 497.
83. In the late nineteenth century, these excise taxes became a major
component of the U.S. tax system, often generating as much as one-third to one-half
of federal tax revenue. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 37–38.
84. For discussion of the tax politics of the late nineteenth century, see id.
at 31–57. See also BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 811, at 457–509.
85. For discussion of the role of political populism in late nineteenth
century financial and monetary debates, see CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION
137–73 (2007); GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA, 1865–1896, at 1–
61, 152–207 (1999). In the politics of the day, the tax, trust, and trade issues were
closely interconnected. No less than Henry Havemeyer, president of the notorious
“sugar trust,” believed that “[t]he mother of all trusts is the Customs Tariff Bill.” Facts
About the Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 1899.
86. Democratic Party Platform (June 21, 1892) reprinted in Democratic
Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1892, June 21, 1892, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29585
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley eds.) (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
87. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 46–47; SELIGMAN, A
STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 493–99.
88. DOUGLAS W. STEEPLES & DAVID O. WHITTEN, DEMOCRACY IN
DESPERATION: THE DEPRESSION OF 1893, at 27–65 (1998).
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crisis and resentment, a broad coalition of Democrats and Progressives won
passage of a new income tax in 1894.89 To its many supporters, the income
tax was more than simply a revenue measure—its passage was also a symbolic
victory over economic privilege and inequality.90
Initially, the income tax had been introduced in the House in January
1894 by Representative Benton McMillin, as an amendment to the already
pending 1894 revenue bill.91 As originally drafted, the tax generally followed
its Civil War predecessor, with certain important structural differences. Unlike
the Civil War tax, which had applied to personal income only, the 1894 Act
taxed corporate profits separately from the income of individuals. Specifically,
in addition to a 2 percent tax on the annual “gains, profits, and income” in
excess of $4,000 of “every citizen of the United States,” it also imposed a 2
percent tax on the annual “net profits or income above actual operating and
business expenses” of all “corporations, companies, or associations,”
excluding partnerships.92 To avoid double taxation, Congress allowed
individuals to exclude dividends from taxable income.93 This shift to taxing
corporations separately from individuals reflected the increasing significance
of corporations in the American economy, as the prevalence of the corporate
form had surged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Since more and
more businesses were being organized as corporations, there were increasing
practical advantages to taxing corporations directly.94
89. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 46–47; SELIGMAN, A
STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 493–99.
90. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 47; SELIGMAN, A
STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 507.
91. 26 CONG. REC. 1,594–97 (1894).
92. 1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25, at §§ 27, 32, 28 Stat. 509,
553, 556–57. Like today, partnership income was attributable to individual partners.
Note that while individual income was taxable only to the extent it exceeded $4,000,
corporate income received no comparable exemption. For comparison, the relative
value of $4,000 in 1894 would be $112,000 in 2013, based on changes in the CPI.
Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount, supra note 31.
93. 1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25, at § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553–
54; see infra Appendix row 4.
94. During the mid- to late-nineteenth century, rapid economic
development, together with the spread of general or free state incorporation laws that
allowed firms to incorporate by following a simple administrative procedure without
the need of specific legislative approval, led to increasing numbers of corporations.
Robert E. Wright, Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation, in CAPITALISM
TAKES COMMAND: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 145 (Gary J. Kornblith & Michael Zakim eds., 2012). Growth in the number,
size, and economic importance of corporations was also driven by institutional
changes that occurred during the Civil War, including an increased reliance on
corporations to coordinate the extractive, manufacturing, and transportation sectors of
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Although the 1894 Act income tax seemed to entail an additional layer
of taxation by taxing corporations directly, in substance it closely followed the
Civil War system, which had imposed a withholding tax on dividend payments
while exempting dividends from individual tax returns. Under both systems,
corporate profits were generally taxed only once.95 Indeed, some scholars have
argued that the 1894 corporate income tax actually targeted individual
investors rather than corporations qua corporations, and was therefore merely
a variation of taxation “at the source” (i.e., taxation paid at the entity level on
behalf of diffuse taxpayers).96 This view—suggesting significant continuity
between the Civil War withholding provisions and the 1894 corporate income
tax—is supported by the statements of Democratic Senator George Vest of
Missouri, a member of the Committee on Finance and one of the key architects
of the 1894 Act:
Instead of making the corporation a collector simply
for the Government, we have endeavored to simplify the bill
and, in my judgment, we have strengthened it, by putting the
tax directly upon the corporation and then allowing the
corporation to adjust its relations with its own stockholders as
it sees proper.97
Viewed in this light, the decision to tax corporations directly was a
matter of administrative convenience, and did not reflect a conception of
corporations as economically distinct from their investors.
the economy. Sean Patrick Adams, Soulless Monsters and Iron Horses: The Civil War,
Institutional Change, and American Capitalism, in CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND:
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 249 (Gary J.
Kornblith & Michael Zakim eds., 2012).
95. The practical similarity of the two systems was accentuated by the high
dividend payout ratios common in the late nineteenth century. Unlike in later decades,
many corporations in the 1890s distributed most of their profits as dividends. STEVEN
A. BANK, ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE TAXATION: TRACING THE COMMON ROOTS
OF DIVERGENT APPROACHES 107–20 (2011); JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J.
MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 189–97 (1999) [hereinafter
BASKIN & MIRANTI, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE]; ROBERT SOBEL, THE
GREAT BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE 1920S, at 32 (1968); BANK, SWORD TO
SHIELD, supra note 16, at 6–7; Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for
Declining Dividends? Evidence from History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 467–74 (2003).
96. See Avi-Yonah, A Defense of the Corporate Tax, supra note 33, at
1214–15; Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 504–37 (2001). Any reader who has had
income or payroll taxes withheld from their regular paycheck will be familiar with “at
the source” taxation.
97. 26 CONG. REC. 6,866 (1894).
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The finer details of the 1894 Act were shaped by the Congressional
debates leading to its enactment. The taxation of corporate interest payments
received particular attention from lawmakers. As originally drafted, the
legislation provided no deductions from corporate income.98 An amendment
supported by Vest, however, proposed that the corporate tax be calculated
based on net earnings “above ordinary working or operating expenses.”99
While clarifying that the tax was to be calculated based on net income, this
amendment also seemed to disallow the deduction of interest, which was
generally considered a fixed expense rather than an operating expense.100
Members of Congress opposed to the income tax’s reintroduction seized on
Vest’s amendment as one of several flaws warranting the tax’s rejection.
Senator David Hill, a Democrat from New York and one of the income tax’s
staunchest opponents, assailed the lack of corporate interest deductibility
during a lengthy floor speech against the tax.101 According to Hill, disallowing
the deduction of fixed charges such as interest was an injustice unprecedented
in the history of taxation, amounting to “robbery under the form of law.”102
Invoking the recent financial crisis and the depressed state of the national
economy, Hill warned that disallowing corporate interest deductions would
“cripple, embarrass, and throw into receiverships hundreds of corporations
now struggling for existence.”103
The day after Hill’s speech, Vest modified his proposal, offering
language permitting corporations to deduct interest on “bonded
indebtedness.”104 The reasons behind Vest’s shift are not entirely clear. While
it may have been an effort to placate critics such as Hill, it also had the effect
of angering the tax’s most fervent supporters. Many observers assumed the
new language was a concession to the railroad industry, which was facing dire
economic conditions in the wake of the financial panic.105 American railroad
corporations were heavily reliant on bond financing, and high leverage led to

98. Id. at 1,59497.
99. Id. at 6,621.
100. Id.
101. Senator Hill—representing New York, one of the nation’s wealthiest
and most highly industrialized state economies—was one of the few Democrats in
Congress to oppose the 1894 income tax. Hill’s role in these debates again illustrates
that regional differences were often more important than party affiliations in
nineteenth-century tax politics.
102. 26 CONG. REC. 6,621 (1894).
103. Id.
104. Id. at. 6,690.
105. Hill’s War Paint On, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Jun. 23, 1894, at 1;
Very Near the End, MORNING OREGONIAN, Jun. 23, 1894, at 1.
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high rates of insolvency as revenues plunged and credit evaporated.106 Given
the power and influence of the railroads, critics of Vest’s revision were quick
to ascribe it to industry lobbying. Claiming that “a large assembly of railroad
people” had visited Washington immediately prior to Vest’s proposal, Senator
Eugene Hale, a Republican from Maine, characterized the amendment as “the
surrender to the railroad corporations.”107 Populist Senator William Allen of
Nebraska went further, alleging that a “certain railroad magnate” (he declined
to specify who) had been invited to the Capitol Building and dictated tax
policy directly to the Senate Finance Committee.108 For his part, Vest denied
the accusations in full:
I know nothing of any railroad people being assembled here.
I have not seen any of them, except as I have seen people here
every day for the last four months; but this amendment has
not been made at the instigation of any corporation. I am
under the influence of no corporation, and have no connection
with any corporation; but we are endeavoring to make this bill
upon just and equitable principles, and this was the result of
consultation amongst the members of the committee.109
Since Vest’s discussions with the Finance Committee were never
publicly reported, the true reasons for the revision—and the extent of railroad
industry influence—remain unknown. Given the precarious financial
environment and the massive debt overhang facing American business,
however, it seems plausible that the solvency of large corporations (such as
railroads) was an important consideration in the Finance Committee’s decision
making. Indeed, before Vest’s revised language was even put to vote,
Connecticut Republican Senator Oliver Platt suggested expanding the
deduction from “bonded indebtedness” to cover all corporate debt, of whatever
form.110 This change was quickly accepted, and deductibility of all interest on
“bonded or other indebtedness” was incorporated into the final law.111
Deductibility of dividends was also a sensitive issue. As drafted, the
1894 bill provided that individual income was taxable only to the extent it
106. By 1897, more than 25 percent of the railroad industry’s total
capitalization (and more than 40 percent of track mileage) would fall into receivership.
BASKIN & MIRANTI, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 95, at 150–51.
107. 26 CONG. REC. 6,690 (1894). The exchanges between Senators Hale
and Vest were widely reported in the nation’s newspapers.
108. Id. at 6,709.
109. Id. at 6,690.
110. Id. at 6,773.
111. 1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25, at § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556–
57; 26 CONG. REC. 6,777 (1894).
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exceeded $4,000 annually. Corporate income, however, enjoyed no
corresponding exemption.112 This meant that while interest paid by
corporations to individuals with incomes less than $4,000 was essentially tax
free (being deductible at the corporate level and untaxed at the individual
level), the payment of dividends to such “low income” investors remained
subject to the corporate-level income tax. During the debates over the tax bill,
many lawmakers sought to eliminate this disparity by allowing corporations
to deduct a portion of their dividends.
Discussion of this issue was strongly influenced by differing
perceptions of bondholders and shareholders. In the early 1890s, large
corporations in need of outside financing typically issued bonds, which
enjoyed a longer-established, deeper, and more liquid market than equity
securities.113 Perhaps for this reason, ownership of bonds and other forms of
debt was commonly associated with the capitalist elite, while ownership of
shares was more often associated with small investors and dependent
beneficiaries, including the proverbial widows and orphans. Given these
stereotypical notions of bondholders and shareholders, the less favorable
treatment of equity under the tax bill was controversial: In the House, Ohio
Democrat Tom Johnson argued that, as drafted, the corporate tax would punish
the most disadvantaged members of society, including “widows or orphans or
aged people.”114 Senator Hill of New York lamented that:
this injustice is upon those people who have incomes of less
than $4,000, the poor people of the country, the widows and
orphans, and the men of infirm health, who rely upon the little
accumulations which have been given to them or which they
have worked for and laid up.115
Although a supporter of the income tax, Senator James Smith, a Democrat
from New Jersey, also warned that the provisions concerning corporations
risked “discriminating against the widow, the orphan, and the man of moderate
means.”116
To address these concerns, Smith introduced an amendment in the
Senate allowing corporations to deduct “any dividends paid to a single
112. See 26 CONG. REC. 1,594–97 (1894).
113. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
30 (1970) [hereinafter CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING]. The dominance of bonds
over stock in the financing of large corporations would not begin to wane until the
“great merger movement” of 1895 through1904. BASKIN & MIRANTI, A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 95, at 194.
114. 26 CONG. REC. 1,652 (1894).
115. Id. at 6,865.
116. Id. at 6,871.
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stockholder not exceeding $4,000 annually.”117 Smith argued this deduction
was necessary to protect not only vulnerable dependents such as widows and
orphans, but also owners of small businesses and members of agricultural
cooperatives.118 Smith’s proposal was criticized on the grounds that it would
be impracticable to administer—according to Vest, the deduction provision
“would be almost impossible of execution.”119 These criticisms were
apparently effective, as Smith’s amendment was tabled by a 31–24 vote.120
Immediately following the vote on Smith’s amendment, Hill proposed a
substantially similar amendment—the only difference being that it provided a
$3,000 per shareholder deduction, rather than $4,000.121 Explaining the
purpose of his amendment, Hill stated that his goal was not to benefit
corporations, but rather to protect individual investors. Again characterizing
the income tax as fundamentally flawed, he claimed its operation would
constitute an injustice against the poor: “I am not complaining because it
affects corporations,” he stated, “I am simply complaining that you make a
discrimination against the poor man.”122 Hill’s rhetorical appeals
notwithstanding, his amendment fared no better than Smith’s, being rejected
by a vote of 33–20.123 Then, in a striking display of either dogged
determination or political posturing (probably the latter), Hill proposed
substantially similar amendments twice more—first with a deduction of
$2,000 and finally with a deduction of $1,000.124 These too were rejected.125
Ultimately, no deductions of dividends would be included in the final law.
Congress finally passed the 1894 Act in late August.126 As enacted, it
retained the 2 percent tax on individual income exceeding $4,000127 as well as
the 2 percent tax on all corporate income.128 Interest payments, but not
dividends, were fully deductible by corporations.129 The corporate interest
deduction was born.
These developments were short-lived, however. The following year,
in the Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. decision, the Supreme Court
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 6,867.
Id. at 6,871–72.
Id. at 6,867.
Id. at 6,872.
Id.
Id. at 6,873.
Id. at 6,875.
Id. at 6,875–78.
Id.
See 1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25.
1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25, at § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
1894 Act to reduce taxation, supra note 25, at § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556–

57.
129. Id.
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struck down the new tax before it was ever collected.130 In a controversial five
to four ruling, the Court held that the income tax violated the Constitution’s
requirement that direct taxes be apportioned on a population basis among the
states.131 The Court’s decision came as a staggering defeat for the tax’s
supporters, who had spent years fighting for income taxation in the national
political arena.
Like the Civil War income tax before it, however, the 1894 tax’s
influence would extend far beyond its abbreviated lifespan. In removing
interest—but not dividends—from the corporate income tax base, the 1894
Act established a precedent followed by the income tax laws passed between
1909 and 1913. Under the 1894 Act, interest was deductible from corporate
income and subject to taxation when received by investors, while dividends
were not deductible from corporate income and not subject to taxation when
received by investors. Since interest and dividends were each subject to a
single level of taxation (interest being taxed at the investor level and dividends
being taxed at the corporate level), and since the individual and corporate tax
rates were both 2 percent, the respective tax burdens on debt and equity were
similar for investor income above $4,000.132 This same basic structure—
interest being taxed at the investor level and dividends being taxed at the
corporate level—was recreated by the tax legislation of the early twentieth
century. As detailed in Part III, it was during the decades of 1909 to 1939,
under the pressures of war, depression, and a massively expanding federal
budget, that preferential treatment of debt financing emerged as a permanent
feature of American tax law.
III.

THE STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBT-EQUITY
DISTINCTION

Income taxation returned to the U.S. in the early twentieth century—
this time permanently. Due to the constitutional constraints on direct taxation
imposed by the Pollock decision, corporate and individual income taxes were
reintroduced in two separate phases. First, a “special excise tax” on corporate
profits––a corporate income tax in all but name––was enacted in 1909. This
corporate tax was joined by a personal income tax in 1913, following
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Although the rates of these taxes
were initially low (only 1 percent on corporate profits and 1 percent to 7
percent on personal income), they would increase significantly within a few
years of their enactment. The extraordinary cost of World War I would prompt
the expansion of the income tax, transforming it into the U.S. government’s
130. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
131. Id.; see also U.S. CONT. art. 1, § 2.
132. If an investor earned less than $4,000 annually, interest went untaxed.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
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single largest source of revenue. Tax rates decreased after the conclusion of
the war and remained stable during the prosperity of the 1920s, but the backto-back crises of the Great Depression and World War II brought further
dramatic changes to the tax system.
Throughout this period, a variety of policy concerns pulled Congress
in conflicting directions regarding the tax treatment of corporate debt and
equity. On the one hand, many lawmakers feared that allowing corporations
to deduct interest would encourage them to take on excess debt in order to
reduce their taxes. On the other hand, lawmakers were also concerned that
disallowing interest deduction would increase the tax burden on shareholders.
Many in Congress assumed that any taxation of funds allocable to interest
payments would be passed on to shareholders in the form of reduced
dividends. The tax treatment of dividends themselves was also a complex
issue. Politicians were vocal in their opposition to double taxation, but as we
shall see, this opposition could waver in the face of political expediency.
Finally, organized business became increasingly involved in tax policy during
this period, injecting further complications into Congressional decision
making. Spurred into action by World War I’s elevated tax rates—by far the
highest to that point in American history—business exerted significant
influence at several key junctures in the income tax’s evolution. During the
three decades preceding World War II, these various factors converged
together to shape the contemporary debt-equity distinction.
A. The Corporation Tax of 1909
In the years following the Pollock decision of 1895, political pressure
to reestablish income taxation continued to mount, despite the constitutional
hurdles imposed by the Supreme Court.133 An unprecedented wave of business
consolidations occurring from 1895 to 1904 increased popular concern over
the economic power of large corporations. In a rapid burst of merger activity,
approximately 1,800 firms disappeared into larger enterprises, mainly by way
of horizontal consolidations.134 Sudden, dramatic increases in the market share
of America’s largest corporations fueled public resentment toward
concentrated wealth, leading even Republican President Theodore Roosevelt
to advocate graduated estate and income taxes in 1906.135 Pressure to reduce
tariffs had not abated in the years following the Pollock decision, and with
even Republican opposition softening, some form of major tax reform began

133. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 22–
23; BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 47–53.
134. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 1–13 (1988).
135. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 21.
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to seem inevitable.136 As the tax issue built to a head in 1909, newly-elected
Republican President William Howard Taft brokered a tax reform compromise
between Congressional conservatives (who opposed income taxation) and
progressives (who supported it): Under Taft’s plan, a small tax on corporate
profits would be enacted immediately, while the question of an individual
income tax would be submitted to the states as a proposed constitutional
amendment.137 Rather than describing the new corporation tax as an income
tax, the measure was labeled a special excise tax pegged to corporate profits,
a transparent (and ultimately successful) bid to circumvent the Pollock
holding.138 Labels aside, the 1909 corporation tax was an income tax both in
design and effect.
The treatment of corporate debt was an important question in drafting
the new tax law. As part of the political compromise to which it owed its
existence, the corporation tax was initially drafted by members of the Taft
Administration, and the choice of whether to tax interest on bonds was a major
issue in the Administration’s internal decision making.139 As in prior decades,
corporate bonds remained closely associated with the nation’s wealthy in the
public consciousness, and the Administration was reluctant to be seen as

136. Id. at 22–24.
137. From a procedural standpoint, the 1909 corporation tax was an unusual
piece of tax legislation. It was first proposed by the presidential administration and
then introduced by the Senate Finance Committee as an amendment to a revenue bill
that had already passed the House. This process was arguably inconsistent with the
constitutional requirement that all revenue bills originate in the House. Indeed, the
corporation tax would be unsuccessfully challenged on these grounds in federal court.
See infra note 138. The Taft Administration’s support of a corporation tax may have
been an effort to forestall an individual income tax, as this was clearly the goal of
conservative Republicans in Congress. Avi-Yonah, A Defense of the Corporate Tax,
supra note 33, at 1217. See also MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY:
PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 215–18 (1990).
Republican Senator Nelson Aldrich, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and
long-time opponent of income taxation, explained his support for the Administration’s
proposal as follows: “I shall vote for a corporation tax as a means to defeat the income
tax.” 44 CONG. REC. 3,929 (1909).
138. Soon after its enactment, the corporation tax was challenged in federal
court on the same grounds as the 1894 income tax—that it violated the Constitution’s
prohibition on unapportioned direct taxation. In the same case, it was also challenged
on the separate grounds that its introduction by the Senate Finance Committee violated
the constitutional requirement that all revenue bills originate in the House. The
Supreme Court upheld the tax on the theory that it was an excise tax, not a direct tax,
despite its similarities to the tax of 1894. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 173–
77 (1911).
139. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 40–
47.
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allowing wealthy bondholders to avoid taxation.140 According to New York
Republican Senator Elihu Root, a close ally of the Taft Administration and
one of the corporation tax’s primary authors, the treatment of corporate bonds
“was the subject of repeated discussion in which the President, the AttorneyGeneral, and other members of the Cabinet and members of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate took part.”141 Despite initial reluctance, the Taft
Administration ultimately decided to allow corporations to deduct interest on
bonds, the tax’s authors fearing that to do otherwise would subject
shareholders to double taxation. In Root’s words:
[t]he final conclusion was that the imposition of this tax on
the entire income, including the income assignable to the
payment of interest on bonds, would result not in the taxation
of bondholders, but in imposing a double tax on the
stockholders, and it was not thought advisable to do it.142
In other words, Root and others believed taxation of any revenues
allocable to interest payments would be passed on to equity holders. The Taft
Administration also considered taxing interest payments directly upon receipt
by bondholders, but this approach was deemed infeasible in light of the
Pollock decision.143
When the Taft Administration’s proposals were first presented to the
Senate Finance Committee in June of 1909, many committee members were
opposed to interest deductibility, fearing that corporations would exchange
bonds for stock in order to avoid the tax.144 Compounding this fear was the
widespread corporate practice of selling watered stock—stock issued at prices
exceeding a corporation’s book value, to the benefit of promoters and other
corporate insiders. A specific concern regarding interest deductibility was that
it would encourage corporations to issue discounted stock to insiders and then
exchange that stock for debt (at full face value), so as to “water” (or dilute) the
stock of outside investors while simultaneously sheltering income.145
140. Insurgents’ Fight Will Hold Congress: Eight Senators at Least Are to
Oppose Taft’s Tax Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 1909, at 2; Is Corporate Taxation
Just, and Will It Aid the Revenues? Opportunities Presented for Diverting the
Earnings before Reaching Form to Be Made Taxable, WALL ST. J., Jun. 26, 1909, at
6; Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, N.Y. WORLD, Jun. 18, 1909.
141. 44 CONG. REC. 4,007 (1909).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 46–
47; Senate to Accept Taft’s Plan, WASH. HERALD, Jun. 22, 1909, at 4 [hereinafter
Senate to Accept Taft’s Plan].
145. See BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 14–15.
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Representative Cordell Hull, a Democrat from Tennessee and a key figure in
the drafting of the legislation, recalled the issue in 1916: “I think the original
theory of the matter was that corporations could issue quite a lot of watered
stock, transfer that into bonds, mortgage their property, and incur interest, and
make a great many shifts in many ways that would result in avoiding the real
purpose of the law.”146
Despite these concerns, a majority of the Senate Finance Committee
eventually agreed that at least some measure of interest deductibility was
necessary, for two reasons. First, as noted above, many lawmakers believed
that disallowing interest deductibility would indirectly increase the tax burden
on shareholders.147 Since the payment terms of outstanding corporate bonds
were fixed—and since bond investors were generally thought to enjoy greater
bargaining power than shareholders—lawmakers feared that taxing amounts
paid as interest would simply reduce the residual funds available for
dividends.148 Second, given that the corporation tax was designed to avoid the
Pollock holding, some lawmakers feared that taxing revenue allocable to
bondholders (or taxing bondholders directly) would be a step too far in the
direction of an undisguised income tax, inviting constitutional challenge.149
Faced with these conflicting concerns, the committee settled on a middle
position proposed by Senator Root: corporations would be permitted to deduct
interest, but only on an amount of debt not exceeding their paid-up capital
stock.150
When the corporation tax advanced from the Senate Finance
Committee to the wider Senate, many Senators had misgivings over allowing
even limited interest deductibility. In the July session, Senator Augustus
146. 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916).
147. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 46–
47; Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N. Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 1909, at 1 [hereinafter
Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan]; Taft is to Fix Tax, WASH. POST, Jun. 22, 1909,
at 1 [hereinafter Taft is to Fix Tax].
148. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29 at 46–
47; Doubling up the Burdens on the Stockholders, WASH. TIMES, Jun. 19, 1909, at 6;
Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, supra note 147; Senate to Accept Taft’s Plan,
supra note 144; Taft is to Fix Tax, supra note 147; Tariff Revision Before All Else,
CHI. DAILY TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 1913, at 9.
149. 44 CONG. REC. 4,007 (1909); BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX, supra note 29, 46–47. The tax would be unsuccessfully challenged in
any event. See supra note 138.
150. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, 46–47.
According to Root, “paid-up capital stock” meant corporate stock for which full value
had been paid. 44 CONG. REC. 4,008 (1909). To illustrate the working of this provision
(which would ultimately be included in the final law), a hypothetical corporation
capitalized with $1,000 of debt and $500 of paid-up capital stock would be allowed to
deduct interest on only $500 of debt.
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Bacon, a Democrat from Georgia, argued that no portion of a corporation’s
interest payments should be exempt from taxation, repeating the familiar
warning that corporations would avoid the tax by converting stock to bonds.151
Referring to popular attitudes toward bondholders, Bacon asserted that “[t]he
desire to reach the bonded interests of the country would be very much more
generally shared by the people at large than the desire to reach simply the
stocks of corporations.”152 Based on this reading of the popular will, Bacon
introduced an amendment to tax interest payments directly at a rate of 2
percent, requiring corporations to withhold and pay the tax on behalf of
bondholders.153 On motion of Senator Aldrich, Bacon’s amendment was
tabled by a 41–34 vote, and no such withholding provision was included in the
Senate’s version of the bill.154
Similar concerns were raised in the House, however. Representative
William Cox, a Democrat from Indiana, protested that accumulated wealth in
the form of bond holdings would not be adequately taxed under the Senate bill.
Since interest payments were deductible from corporate income, but were not
taxed when received by individual investors (there being no individual income
tax), a significant portion of corporate profits would escape taxation
altogether. According to Cox, “[t]he railroads alone, being bonded for upward
of $6,000,000,000, and the trusts for at least an equal sum, these sums
representing one-ninth of the total wealth of the country, under this system of
taxation all this immense wealth will escape the burden.”155 Highlighting the
connections—both actual and perceived—between corporate debt and the
nation’s wealthiest citizens, Cox argued that bond holdings such as the
Andrew Carnegie and Jay Gould fortunes would avoid “their just and
proportionate share of taxation.”156 “The idea that men like Carnegie,” he
stated, “now the holder of more than $300,000,000 worth of the bonds of the
United States steel trust, escape federal taxation is indeed absurd.”157 Despite
these criticisms, Cox ultimately agreed to support the tax bill, a reflection of
Congress’s limited taxation options following the Pollock ruling. From the
perspective of Cox and other Democrats, if taxing individual investors was off
the table, the proposed corporation tax, however flawed, was better than
nothing.158
The Senate Finance Committee’s limitation of interest deductibility to
debt not exceeding paid-up capital stock was agreed to by the Conference
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

44 CONG. REC. 4,00708 (1909).
Id. at 4,062.
Id.
Id. at. 4,06263.
Id. at 4,422.
Id. at. 4,424.
Id.
Id. at 4421–44 (1909).
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Committee and included in the final law, signed in August 1909, imposing a
1 percent tax on corporate profits in excess of $5,000.159 Since the corporation
tax was not accompanied by an individual income tax, corporate income paid
as interest to individual debtholders went untaxed, subject to the paid-up
capital limitation. Profits paid as dividends, on the other hand, were taxed at
the corporate level.160 This disparity bestowed a tax advantage on debt
financing, as corporations were able to offset interest payments against taxable
income. With a corporate tax rate of only 1 percent, however, this advantage
was so small that it likely had little effect on corporate financing decisions. It
was not until after the return of individual income taxation that the tax
advantage of debt would become economically significant.
B.

The Return of Individual Income Taxation

The return of individual income taxation in 1913 occurred at the
height of the Progressive Era. Progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson won
the 1912 presidential election, and the year 1913 witnessed several major
developments in Progressive legal and regulatory reform. These included the
Pujo Committee’s influential report on the “money trust” of Wall Street
banking firms, the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the establishment
of separate U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, and the ratification of
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution.161
The tax-related developments of 1913 were particularly significant.
Following the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment—which allowed
Congress to levy an unapportioned income tax, effectively overturning
Pollock—the 1913 Act reinstituted individual income taxation while
simultaneously reducing tariffs. This Act marked the beginning of a longerterm policy shift by which the income tax would ultimately replace tariffs as
the government’s primary source of revenue.162 The tax system evolved
rapidly in the years following 1913, especially during the crises of the world
wars and the Great Depression. Although the most dramatic of these changes
came in the form of higher income tax rates, structural features of the tax
system, such as the treatment of debt and equity, saw important changes as
159. 1909 Act to provide revenue, supra note 19, at § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–
17.
160. See infra Appendix row 5.
161. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 113, at 137–55; JAMES
LIVINGSTON, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MONEY, CLASS, AND
CORPORATE CAPITALISM, 18901913, at 215–34 (1986); SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE
RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 18851914, at 90–91 (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at
the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 500, 536–47 (1996).
162. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 55.
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well. The tax burden on debt and equity was similar under the 1913 Act, but
by the late 1930s debt enjoyed a significant structural advantage over equity,
a feature of U.S. tax law that has persisted to the present day.
As enacted, the details of the 1913 Act were more elaborate than those
of its predecessors. The Act imposed a “normal income tax” of 1 percent on
individual income exceeding $3,000 ($4,000 for married couples), plus an
“additional tax” increasing in graduated brackets to a maximum of 6 percent
on income exceeding $500,000.163 As under the 1909 Act, business
corporations were subject to a flat income tax of 1 percent (though now
without the $5,000 exemption).164 Interest payments remained deductible, and
the statutory deduction limit was relaxed: a corporation could now deduct
interest on an amount of debt equal to one-half the sum of its paid-up capital
and outstanding debt.165 Interest received by investors was taxed as ordinary
income, subject to both the normal and additional taxes.166 Unlike interest,
dividends were not deductible at the corporate level.167 At the individual level,
however, dividends received a partial tax break: they were excluded from
income for purposes of the normal tax, while being included for purposes of
the graduated additional tax.168
The combined effect of these rules was that corporate revenues were
subject to similar amounts of taxation regardless of whether they were paid as
interest or distributed as dividends. To illustrate, profits distributed as
dividends were subject to (a) the 1 percent corporate tax and (b) the individual
additional tax (depending on the investor’s total income); whereas, interest
payments were subject to (a) the 1 percent individual normal tax and (b) the
individual additional tax (depending on the investor’s total income). If a
corporation was managed with the goal of minimizing the tax burden on its

163. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.A, 38 Stat. 114, 16667. Based on changes in the CPI, the relative value of $3,000
in 1913 would be $72,800 in 2013, while the relative value of $500,000 would be
$12,100,000. Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount, supra note 31. Given the
national income distribution, this was a highly progressive tax—in its first years, only
about 2 percent of American households paid any income tax at all. BROWNLEE, A
SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 57.
164. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
165. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.B, 38 Stat. 114, 16768.
166. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.B, 38 Stat. 114, 16768.
167. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.G(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172–74.
168. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.B, 38 Stat. 114, 16768 (1913); see infra Appendix row 6.
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investors, it would have been indifferent between issuing debt or equity with
the same pre-tax return.169
There were exceptions to this general parity, however. Dividends paid
to other corporations (e.g., dividends paid by a subsidiary to a holding
company) were not excluded from the receiving corporation’s income. Under
the 1909 Act, such intercompany dividends had not been taxable.170 Under the
1913 Act, corporations were subject to the 1 percent corporate tax, even
though the paying corporation was also taxed on the underlying profits.171
Despite rhetorical opposition to double taxation, many lawmakers considered
it politically necessary that the income tax reach unpopular trusts and holding
companies. Lawmakers feared that exempting distributions from subsidiaries
to holding companies would create the appearance of letting the nation’s
largest corporations off the hook. 172 Since profits were taxed at both the
subsidiary and holding company levels, the 1913 Act disadvantaged equity as
a means of effecting intercompany transfers. A holding company that wished
to avoid the double tax could instead structure its interest in a subsidiary as a
loan.
As for the treatment of debt, the 1913 Act’s relaxation of the interest
deduction limit was the first in a series of steps that would eventually
culminate in the limit’s repeal. As originally reported by the Ways and Means
Committee in April of 1913, the revenue bill followed the 1909 Act in limiting
interest deductibility to debt not exceeding paid-up capital.173 After the bill
passed the House, however, the Senate Finance Committee relaxed the limit.
Under the committee’s version, corporations were allowed to deduct interest
on debt not exceeding one-half the sum of outstanding debt and paid-up
capital, a change accepted by the House in conference.174 During the
committee’s hearings on the bill, several business lobbyists had requested that
the deduction limit be increased, characterizing it as unfair to highly-leveraged
companies and unnecessary given the new individual income tax.175 Although
169. In reality, corporate managers may have found debt financing more
attractive, as the tax on interest was payable by investors rather than by the corporation
itself. Again, since the corporate tax rate was only 1 percent, any such preference was
likely minor.
170. 1909 Act to provide revenue, supra note 19, at § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–
17.
171. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 100.
172. Big Trusts Face a Twofold Tax, CHI. DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1913, at
17.
173. H.R. 3321, 63rd Cong. § 2.G (1913).
174. S. REP. NO. 63-80, at 26 (1913). H.R. REP. NO. 63-86 (1913). To
illustrate, a hypothetical corporation capitalized with $1,000 of debt and $500 of paidup capital stock would be allowed to deduct interest on only $750 of debt.
175. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 15–17.
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neither the Senate Finance Committee’s amendment nor its acceptance by the
House were specifically explained in the legislative record, it seems likely
these appeals on the part of the business community were influential in
Congress’s decision-making.
The deduction limit was increased again in 1916—this time to debt
not exceeding the sum of paid-up capital and one-half of outstanding debt.176
Unlike in 1913, this increase was accompanied by specific legislative
discussion. During House debate of the 1916 bill, Representative Joseph
Sherley, a Democrat from Kentucky, suggested that the deduction limit be
removed entirely. Sherley questioned the limit’s fundamental rationale, given
that interest was now taxed when received by individual debtholders. He also
argued that the limit was unfair to corporations, since sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and other unincorporated businesses—taxed under the individual
income tax rules—were allowed to deduct interest in full. Finally, he pointed
to problems with the limit’s application by the Bureau, arguing that “the
provision has resulted in endless confusion in the department, conflicting
rulings, and more trouble than almost any other single paragraph in the
income-tax law.”177 Responding to Sherley’s criticisms, Representative Hull
reiterated the limit’s primary purpose—to reduce the incentive for
corporations to exchange stock for bonds. Although Hull supported
maintaining the limit, his comments suggest he was not unsympathetic to the
complaints being raised by the business community. Describing the 1909
version of the limit as “somewhat drastic,” Hull remarked that subsequent
increases were intended to moderate the limit’s effect.178 Ultimately, the
deduction limit remained in place, though it was pegged at increasingly higher
debt levels.179 This trend toward greater leniency would continue into World

176. An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 64271, § 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 767–69 (1916) [hereinafter 1916 Act to increase revenue];
see infra Appendix row 7. To illustrate, a hypothetical corporation capitalized with
$1,000 of debt and $500 of paid-up capital stock would be allowed to deduct interest
on all $1,000 of debt. However, particularly highly-leveraged corporations were not
able to deduct interest on all of their debt. For example, a corporation capitalized with
$1,400 of debt and $100 of paid-up capital stock would be allowed to deduct interest
on only $800 of debt.
177. 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916). There had been considerable confusion
surrounding the Treasury Department’s application of the 1913 limit. The Treasury
Department had initially interpreted the limit as one-half of the sum of outstanding
debt and paid-up capital, but later revised its interpretation to the sum of paid-up
capital and one-half of outstanding debt. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at
17–18.
178. 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916).
179. In Representative Hull’s words, “[t]he original provision was modified,
but it was not thrown wide open.” 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916).
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War I, during which major developments in business taxation would lead to
the limit’s complete repeal.
C.

World War I and Unlimited Interest Deductibility

American entry into World War I brought major changes to the new
income tax. Like the Civil War before it, World War I demanded extraordinary
spending while simultaneously disrupting foreign trade and tariff revenues.
Congress relied on the income tax to help finance mobilization, raising tax
rates to levels unimaginable before the war. Ironically, while the war led to
substantially higher tax rates, it would also lead to the permanent repeal of the
limit on corporate interest deductibility.
During the war, higher corporate income tax rates, together with the
introduction of supplemental excess-profits and war-profits taxes,
significantly increased the tax burden on American businesses.180 The excessprofits tax was particularly heavy, accounting for approximately two-thirds of
all tax revenues during the war.181 In 1917, the standard corporate income tax
increased to a total rate of 6 percent.182 For the 1918 tax year, the 1919 Act
increased the corporate tax rate again to 12 percent.183 These figures were
dwarfed by the excess-profits tax, which reached as high as 80 percent for the
1918 tax year.184
With American soldiers fighting overseas, business leaders were
reluctant to directly criticize higher taxes. Rather than lobbying for the
reduction of nominal tax rates, businesses instead focused on the tax laws’
more technical provisions.185 The interest deduction limit is a case in point.
Higher marginal tax rates increased the value of deductions—all the more so
because the amount of the excess-profits tax was calculated based on net
income under the standard corporate income tax.186 As the value of deductions
180. The “war-profits tax” was the statutory designation for the highest
bracket of the excess-profits tax. An Act to provide revenue, and for other purposes,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 301(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1088 (1919) [hereinafter 1919 Act to
provide revenue].
181. BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 64–65.
182. An Act to provide revenue to defray war expenses, and for other
purposes, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 Act to
defray war expenses].
183. 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat.
1057, 1075–76.
184. 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 301(a), 40 Stat. 1057,
1088.
185. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29 at 127–
28, 141.
186. Id. at 185–88.
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increased, a broad array of businesses, trade groups, and conservative editorial
boards began to call for the complete repeal of the interest deduction limit.187
Perhaps strategically, criticisms of the interest deduction limit often
emphasized abstract notions of tax fairness, rather than focusing on the dollar
amounts that businesses would save (and the Treasury would lose) if the limit
were repealed. A common criticism was that overlap of the excess-profits tax
and the interest deduction limit unfairly penalized debt financing, an argument
based on the technical operation of the excess-profits tax. First enacted under
the 1917 Act, the excess-profits tax (which applied to all businesses, not just
corporations) was levied in addition to the standard income tax and was
intended to capture the excess profits derived from war contracts. The tax was
implemented in two different versions: the original version was enacted in the
fall of 1917188 and a revised version applicable to the 1918 tax year was
enacted in early 1919.189 Under the 1917 Act, the tax was calculated as a
graduated percentage of a company’s net income, ranging from 0 percent to
60 percent, which increased along with the ratio of the company’s net income
to its statutorily-defined “invested capital.” In other words, the greater a
company’s net income divided by its invested capital, the higher the rate of
the excess-profits tax.190 Under the 1919 Act, the tax was calculated as a
graduated percentage of net income, ranging from 0 percent to 65 percent,
which, again, increased along with the ratio of the company’s net income to
its invested capital.191 The 1919 Act also added a war-profits bracket of 80
percent, subject to a deduction based on the company’s pre-war financial
performance.192 Under both the 1917 and 1919 versions, the greater a
company’s invested capital (other things being equal), the less its excessprofits tax liability. Critically, invested capital was defined to include equity

187. See, e.g., Revenue to Defray War Expenses: Hearings and Briefs Before
the S. Comm. on Finance on H.R. 4280, 65th Cong. 1423 (1917) (statement of A. E.
Holcomb); To Provide Revenue for War Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 65th Cong. 10419 (1918) (statement of Robert E. Reed); Federal Treatment
of Borrowed Capital, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1918, at 14.
188. 1917 Act to defray war expenses, supra note 182, at § 20014, 40 Stat.
300, 30208.
189. 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 30037, 40 Stat.
1057, 1088–96.
190. 1917 Act to defray war expenses, supra note 182, at § 20103, 40 Stat.
300, 30208. This is a necessarily simplified description of the tax.
191. 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 301(a), 40 Stat. 1057,
1088. This is a necessarily simplified description of the tax.
192. An Act to provide revenue, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 65-50,
§§ 301(a), 311, 40 Stat. 300, 1088, 1090–91 (1917). Again, this is a necessarily
simplified description.
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and undistributed profits, but not to include most forms of debt.193 Since debt
financing did not contribute to invested capital, the excess-profits tax weighed
heavier on highly leveraged firms. Critics argued that this penalty on debt
financing more than offset the benefit of interest deductibility, and that as long
as the excess-profits tax remained in effect, the interest deduction limit should
be removed.
Examples of this argument can be found in Congressional hearings on
the war revenue acts, where business representatives—often present at
Republican invitation—submitted their views on pending tax legislation. In a
statement to the Senate Finance Committee in 1917, A. E. Holcomb, the
Assistant Secretary of AT&T, argued that the deduction limit had become a
“peculiar” and “arbitrary” anachronism.194 At the same hearing,
representatives of the Interborough Rapid Transit Co. termed the limit
“unjust,” arguing that it was particularly inequitable in conjunction with the
excess-profits tax.195 At another Senate Finance Committee hearing, Benson
Watson, Secretary of the National Association of Credit Men (a major trade
group representing credit professionals), argued that since debt was excluded
from invested capital under the excess-profits tax, “the business entity should
have the privilege of charging, as a business expense, the total amount of
interest paid.”196 W. E. Humphrey, a lobbyist representing northwestern
mortgage lenders, testified that because of the deduction limit, highly indebted
firms could accrue tax liabilities even when operating at a loss, an outcome
with “no justice to it.”197 This injustice was compounded by the operation of
the excess-profits tax, he argued, which penalized borrowing even further.198
Addressing the deduction limit’s original policy rationale, Humphrey
summarized his critique as follows:
I never knew of but one reason why it was inserted in the
present law, and that reason was, probably, to keep a
corporation from decreasing its capital stock and increasing
193. 1917 Act to defray war expenses, supra note 182, at § 207, 40 Stat. 300,
306; 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 325, 40 Stat. 1057, 109193.
194. Revenue to Defray War Expenses: Hearings and Briefs Before the S.
Comm. on Finance on H.R. 4280, 65th Congress 2122 (1917) (statement of A. E.
Holcomb).
195. Revenue to Defray War Expenses: Hearings and Briefs Before the S.
Comm. on Finance on H.R. 4280, 65th Congress 27 (1917) (memorandum submitted
on behalf of the Interborough Rapid Transit Co. of New York City).
196. To Provide Revenue for War Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 65th Congress 287 (1918) (statement of Benson Watson).
197. To Provide Revenue for War Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 65th Congress 627 (1918) (statement of W. E. Humphrey).
198. Id. at 62629.
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its bonded indebtedness. But if that was the reason, that is the
only reason I can imagine why it ever did get into law; and
that reason has disappeared under the excess-profits tax,
because if they reduce their capital stock and increase their
bonded indebtedness they would have to pay more.199
According to Humphrey, the excess-profits tax negated the deduction limit’s
reason for existence.
Perhaps responding to these criticisms, the Treasury Department
issued regulations in early 1918 that broadened the definition of invested
capital under the excess-profits tax. Under the Treasury Department’s
regulations, corporations were permitted to include debt in invested capital,
but only to the extent that interest thereon was not deductible from taxable
income (i.e., to the extent it exceeded the statutory deduction limit).200 By
reducing the excess-profits tax’s penalty on debt financing, this regulatory
action seemed to address the business community’s primary grievance.
Nevertheless, lobbying against the deduction limit continued. In what
appears to have been a particularly influential step, a large coalition of banks
and trust companies petitioned the Ways and Means Committee in June of
1918.201 In written testimony cosigned by 36 financial companies (including
powerful Wall Street institutions such as Chase National Bank, Goldman,
Sachs & Co., and the Guaranty Trust Company), the coalition put forward
several tax reform recommendations, including complete elimination of the
interest deduction limit.202 Many of these companies stood to benefit from the
limit’s repeal, not only because they themselves used considerable amounts of
debt financing, but also because a large portion of their business was
underwriting bonds issued by their clients.
The Ways and Means Committee was receptive to the coalition’s
arguments. “The suggestions are most valuable,” Democratic Chairman
Claude Kitchin remarked, “and I am sure that the Committee will take them
under serious consideration.”203 Indeed, several of the group’s proposals—
including its suggestion to eliminate the interest deduction limit—were
incorporated by the Ways and Means Committee into the revenue bill reported
199. Id. at 627.
200. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REGULATIONS NO. 41, RELATIVE TO THE
WAR EXCESS PROFITS TAX IMPOSED BY THE WAR REVENUE ACT, APPROVED
OCTOBER 3, 1917, 18 (1918).
201. Present Revenue Tax Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1918, at 7
[hereinafter Present Revenue Tax Reforms].
202. One of the petition’s primary drafters, Morris F. Frey of the Guaranty
Trust Company, had publically called for the limit’s repeal earlier in the year. Plea for
Revision of Income Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1918, at 17.
203. Present Revenue Tax Reforms, supra note 201.
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in September.204 In its report, the Ways and Means Committee explained (in
language echoing that of corporate lobbyists) that since borrowed money was
not included in “invested capital” under the excess-profits tax, it was “only
fair” to allow the deduction of all interest from taxable income.205 Strangely,
the Ways and Means Committee made no mention of the fact that the Treasury
Department had already addressed this issue earlier in the year.206 In any case,
the Ways and Means Committee’s change—lauded in the business press—was
included in the final law enacted February 1919.207
As this sequence of events makes clear, Congress’s primary rationale
for repealing the interest deduction limit was the manner in which it
overlapped with the excess-profits tax. However, when the excess-profits tax
was itself repealed in 1921, unlimited interest deductibility remained in place,
without any explanation in the legislative history.208 Although previously a
recurrent subject of vigorous debate, in just a few short years, interest
deductibility appears to have become a fait accompli among lawmakers. The
sole discussion of interest deductibility in the legislative history of the
Revenue Act of 1921 concerned whether taxpayers could deduct interest on
debt incurred to purchase tax-exempt securities.209 At no point in these
discussions did lawmakers express any doubt as to whether interest should be
fully deductible by corporations in ordinary circumstances.210
By repealing the excess-profits tax without restoring the interest
deduction limit, the Revenue Act of 1921 began the era of unlimited interest
deductibility. Interest has remained fully deductible by corporations ever
since, subject to specific and relatively narrow exceptions. During the 1920s,
the tax advantage conferred on debt financing by interest deductibility was
relatively small, as interest received was taxable to individuals, while
204. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-767 (1918). This bill became law as 1919 Act to
provide revenue, supra note 180. In addition to calling for repeal of the interest
deduction limit, the group also proposed that all corporate debt be included within the
definition of “invested capital” under the excess-profits tax. Present Revenue Tax
Reforms, supra note 201. This latter proposal was not adopted by the Ways and Means
Committee.
205. H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 1213 (1918).
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 22–23; see infra Appendix
row 8.
208. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, §§ 300–38, 42 Stat. 227, 27177
(1921) provided that 1921 would be the final year of the excess-profits tax. Warren,
The Corporate Interest Deduction, supra note 11, at 1586; see infra Appendix row 9.
209. Under the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress prohibited taxpayers from
deducting interest on debt incurred to purchase tax-exempt securities (such as
municipal, state, and certain federal bonds) because of the potential for such
transactions to serve as abusive tax shelters.
210. See, for example, the exchange at 61 CONG. REC. 7,231 (1921).
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dividends remained partially exempt.211 As discussed below, the advent of full
double taxation in the 1930s would disturb this balance, providing corporate
debt a more economically potent advantage over equity.
D.

Double Taxation

Despite Congress’s oft-voiced concern for avoiding double taxation,
corporate profits were in fact regularly double taxed, even prior to the 1930s.
Under the 1913 Act, corporate profits were taxed at the entity level. When the
same profits were distributed to shareholders as dividends, they were excluded
from income for purposes of the modest “normal income tax,” but included in
income for purposes of the graduated “additional tax.”212 This meant that
dividend income received by shareholders who were subject to the additional
tax (i.e., wealthy shareholders) was actually taxed twice: once when
recognized by the corporation and again when received by the individual
investor.
At first, this limited form of double taxation was of little economic
significance, as at 1 percent, the corporate rate was not only extremely low (by
today’s standards), but also identical to the individual normal rate.213 Parity
between the corporate rate and the individual normal rate (from which
dividends were exempt) meant that interest and dividends were generally
subject to the same amount of taxation, regardless of the individual taxpayer’s
income. Profits distributed as dividends were subject to (a) the 1 percent
corporate tax plus (b) the applicable amount (if any) of the individual
additional tax, while revenues paid as interest were subject to (a) the 1 percent
individual tax plus (b) the applicable amount (if any) of the individual
additional tax. An exception, of course, was interest paid by corporations in
excess of the interest deduction limit. These amounts were subject to the
corporate tax, the individual normal tax, and the individual additional tax.214
As discussed above, the interest deduction limit was repealed by the 1919 Act,
which applied to the 1918 tax year.
Beginning in 1917, corporate and individual rates began to diverge,
with the corporate rate surpassing the individual normal rate.215 Although a
211. See supra text accompanying Part III.
212. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note 20, at
§ II.B, 38 Stat. 114, 16768; see supra text accompanying notes 1633– 173.
213. Under the 1913 Act, the corporate rate and the individual normal rate
were both 1 percent. 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue, supra note
20, at §§ II.A, II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 166, 172.
214. 1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat.
1057, 1077.
215. In 1916, the individual normal rate was 2 percent (with a $3,000
standard deduction) and the corporate rate was 2 percent (with no standard deduction).
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higher corporate tax rate would have tended to disadvantage equity relative to
debt (since dividends were not deductible from corporate income), the
operation of the excess-profits tax from 1917 to 1921 dominated this effect by
significantly penalizing debt. Given the higher corporate tax rate and the
elimination of the interest deduction limit, this disadvantage was reversed
when the excess-profits tax was repealed, and the total tax burden on dividends
(i.e., corporate plus individual taxes) was greater than that on interest for the
remainder of the decade.
The tax disadvantage of equity financing increased during the New
Deal, when a series of legislative developments led to full double taxation of
dividends. During President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term, amidst the
depths of the Great Depression, several of Roosevelt’s advisers recommended
policies intended to deter corporations from hoarding profits in the form of
retained earnings.216 These advisers, including Adolf Berle, Raymond Moley,
and Rexford Tugwell (each Columbia University professors and members of
Roosevelt’s “brain trust” of academic advisers), believed excessive earnings
retention had contributed to the depression and was impeding economic
recovery.217 They argued that encouraging corporations to increase dividend
payments would stimulate the economy by putting money back in the hands
of investors.218 This macroeconomic argument was joined by a concern that
retained earnings were being undertaxed, as income retained at the corporate
level and not distributed as dividends escaped the graduated surtax otherwise
payable by wealthy investors—as had been the case since 1913, individual
income remained subject to a graduated additional tax, now called a “surtax,”

1916 Act to increase revenue, supra note 176, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 1(a), 7(a), 39
Stat. 756, 756, 761. In 1917, the individual normal rate increased to a total of 4 percent
(with a $1,000 standard exemption), while the corporate rate increased to a total of 6
percent (with no standard deduction). 1917 Act to defray war expenses, supra note
182, at §§ 1, 3, 4, 40 Stat. 300, 30002. For the 1918 tax year, the individual normal
rate increased to 6 percent on income between $1,000 and $5,000, and 12 percent on
income above $5,000, while the corporate rate increased to 12 percent on all income.
1919 Act to provide revenue, supra note 180, at §§ 210(a), 216, 230(a)(1), 40 Stat.
1057, 1062, 1069, 1076. In subsequent years, the corporate rate was generally higher
than the individual normal rate.
216. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 184–88. Retained
earnings are profits held or reinvested by a corporation, rather than distributed to
shareholders.
217. Id. at 198–203.
218. Id.
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at high income levels.219 In order to address both issues, Roosevelt’s advisers
proposed levying a special tax on retained earnings.220
Following this recommendation, Roosevelt proposed major changes
to corporate taxation in a special budget message delivered to Congress in
early 1936.221 Under the President’s proposal, (a) earnings retained by
corporations would be subject to a new undistributed-profits tax, (b)
corporations would be permitted to deduct dividend payments from taxable
income, and (c) dividend payments received by investors would be fully taxed
at the individual level (under both the normal income tax and the surtax).222
The combined effect of this proposal was that corporate income would be
taxed once at the corporate level if retained under the undistributed-profits tax
or once at the individual level if distributed as dividends under applicable
individual taxes. Corporate income would be subject to double taxation only
if it were retained in one tax year and then distributed to shareholders in a
subsequent tax year. Describing a need to plug “leaks” in the U.S. tax system,
President Roosevelt argued for his proposal in the following terms:
The accumulation of surplus in corporations
controlled by taxpayers with large incomes is encouraged by
the present freedom of undistributed corporate income from
surtaxes. Since stockholders are the beneficial owners of both
distributed and undistributed corporate income, the aim, as a
matter of fundamental equity, should be to seek equality of
tax burden on all corporate income whether distributed or
withheld from the beneficial owners. As the law now stands
our corporate taxes dip too deeply into the shares of corporate
earnings going to stockholders who need the disbursement of
dividends; while the shares of stockholders who can afford to

219. Kwall, The Uncertain Case, supra note 11, at 619–20. Accumulation of
undistributed earnings by a corporation for the purpose of avoiding the individual
additional tax was prohibited by law beginning with the revenue act of 1913. Due to
difficulties in establishing the necessary intent, however, enforcement of this
prohibition was nearly impossible. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
supra note 29, at 404–06.
220. Id.
221. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Supplemental Budget Message to
Congress (Mar. 3, 1936), reprinted in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Supplemental Budget
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
Message
to
Congress,
THE
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15255 (Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley
eds.) [hereinafter Roosevelt, 1936 Supplemental Budget Message to Congress];
BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, 401–03.
222. Roosevelt, 1936 Supplemental Budget Message to Congress, supra
note 221.
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leave earnings undistributed escape current surtaxes
altogether.223
In other words, Roosevelt advocated direct taxation of corporate
surpluses in order to reach the beneficial (if unrealized) income of individual
shareholders.
Roosevelt’s proposal drew strong criticism from the business
community. The primary objection was not that Roosevelt’s proposal entailed
higher taxes, but rather that the government was attempting to use the tax
system to substitute its own business judgment for that of corporate
managers.224 Many business leaders feared that an undistributed-profits tax
would incite shareholders to demand higher dividends, reducing management
prerogative over the allocation of corporate funds.225 For Roosevelt
Administration advisers such as Adolf Berle, who believed that managers
hoarded earnings to entrench their own economic power, this was exactly the
point.226
The controversy over the undistributed-profits tax reflected two major
developments in American business history: first, the growth of public stock
ownership during the early twentieth century, and second, the corresponding
increase in managers’ independence from investors. The growth of public
shareholding, beginning in the 1890s and accelerating rapidly in the 1920s,
meant that large corporations were increasingly owned by diffuse, anonymous
public shareholders.227 Reflecting this trend, the total annual trading volume
on the New York Stock Exchange increased dramatically during this period,
growing from 159 million in 1900 to a pre-crash peak of 1.1 billion in 1929.228
Broad public shareholding contributed to the separation of ownership and
control identified by Berle. As corporate ownership became more and more
223. Id.
224. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 198–203.
225. Id.
226. Berle’s views were expressed in his seminal work on corporate
governance (written with Gardiner Means), The Modern Corporation and Private
Property. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION].
227. The rise of public stock ownership was initially driven by the great
merger movement of 1895 through1904, in which a sweeping wave of industrial
consolidations was financed in large part by floating public stock. BASKIN & MIRANTI,
A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 95, at 193–97.
228. Id. at 167. This increase in trading volume was accompanied by rising
stock values: The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased from a low of 52.96 in 1900
to a pre-crash peak of 381.17 in 1929. Historical Chart Gallery: Dow Jones Industrial
Average (1900-present, monthly), STOCKCHARTS.COM, http://stockcharts.com/free
charts/historical/djia1900.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).

2015]

The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction

141

dispersed, professional managers (often holding only small equity stakes)
became increasingly autonomous from unorganized investors.229
Despite this separation of ownership and control, at the time of
Roosevelt’s proposal, the interests of management and affluent shareholders
were actually aligned for tax purposes. Wealthy shareholders benefited if
earnings were retained at the corporate level due to the high individual surtax
that would otherwise be triggered by dividend payments. As of 1935, this
surtax ranged as high as 75 percent, while the maximum corporate rate was
only 15.75 percent.230 As Roosevelt had alluded in his budget message to
Congress, many shareholders preferred that earnings not be distributed as
dividends, a preference which was reinforced by favorable tax treatment of
capital gains.231 At the time, up to 70 percent of long-term capital gains could
be excluded from individual income, meaning that if an investor held corporate
stock long enough prior to sale (the maximum exclusion was achieved if stock
was held 10 years or more), appreciation was taxed at a maximum rate of only
23.7 percent.232 Wealthy shareholders therefore paid less taxes if corporate
earnings were “locked in” at the corporate level and realized as capital gains
in later years. Roosevelt’s proposal to replace the corporate income tax with a
heavy undistributed-profits tax threatened to reverse this calculus. By taxing
the “accumulation of surplus in corporations,” the undistributed-profits tax
was intended to drive a wedge between managers’ and shareholders’
preferences regarding dividend policy.233
Notwithstanding staunch opposition from business groups, the
Roosevelt Administration’s proposals—including an undistributed-profits tax
ranging as high as 42.5 percent—were included in a revenue bill passed by the

229. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 226, see
also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994). For an examination of the historical developments in American
corporate law that contributed to the disempowerment of small investors, see Colleen
Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting Rights
and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA 66–93
(Kenneth Lipartito & David Sicilia eds., 2004).
230. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, §§ 101–02, 49 Stat. 1014,
101417 (1935); see infra Appendix row 10.
231. Roosevelt, 1936 Supplemental Budget Message to Congress, supra
note 221.
232. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714
(1934).
233. Roosevelt, 1936 Supplemental Budget Message to Congress, supra
note 221.

142

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 18:3

House in April 1936, by an overwhelming 267–93 margin.234 When the bill
reached the more conservative Senate Finance Committee later that month,
however, business was able to successfully intervene. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (the nation’s largest business group), a number of smaller trade
organizations, and a host of individual companies invested significant effort
into influencing the committee’s handling of the bill. These efforts were not
enough to block the undistributed-profits tax entirely, but the version of the
tax that emerged from the committee was significantly weaker than the
Roosevelt Administration’s original proposal.
In the course of its deliberations, the Senate Finance Committee heard
testimony from approximately 100 outside witnesses, most of whom spoke on
behalf of business interests.235 Reflecting the growing presence of business
organizations in national politics, the range of industry groups at the hearings
was extremely broad, including not only the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but
also the American Association of Railroads, the American Bankers’
Association, the American Management Association, the American Mining
Congress, the National Association of Credit Men, the National Association
of Manufacturers, and many others. Over the preceding decades, national
business associations had grown in number, size, and influence, often with
active support from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Perhaps ironically, the
involvement of these associations in federal lawmaking processes had actually
increased under the cooperative system of industry cartelization administered
by Roosevelt’s National Recovery Administration.236 In Washington, these
associations were collectively represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
itself originally created at the behest of the Taft Administration.237 These
groups, lobbying on behalf of their members, overwhelmingly opposed the
undistributed-profits tax.238
For the most part, business associations generally represented the
outlook and policy preferences of professional managers. However, it is
important to note that the undistributed-profits tax was also opposed by at least
some shareholders. In a particularly interesting case of shareholder opposition,
234. Turner Catledge, House Gets New Tax Bill, but Yield is Still in Doubt;
Quick Passage is Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at 1; $803,000,000 Tax Bill
Wins by Vote of 267-93 in House; Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1936, at 1.
235. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 414–
17.
236. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 159–95 (1987).
237. Richard Hume Werking, Bureaucrats, Businessmen, and Foreign
Trade: The Origins of the United States Chamber of Commerce, 52 BUS. HIST. REV.
321 (1978).
238. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 414–
17.
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Catherine Curtis, director of Women Investors in America (claiming to
represent between one-third and one-half, by number, of all shareholders in
large public corporations), testified to the Senate Finance Committee that the
likely result of the “unsound,” “revolutionary,” “confiscatory” undistributedprofits tax was that “small businesses are destroyed, recovery is retarded,
investments are impaired.”239 Of particular concern to Women Investors in
America was that the undistributed-profits tax would prevent corporations
from building financial reserves to protect against business downturns. This
was precisely the same argument made by many corporate managers. The
extent to which Women Investors in America’s position was representative of
other shareholder groups is unclear, but—perhaps tellingly—I have found no
evidence of any shareholder groups supporting the undistributed-profits tax.
Following its hearings, the Senate Finance Committee significantly
modified Roosevelt’s bill. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was particularly
influential in this process—not only did it participate in the committee’s
hearings, it was also directly involved in drafting the committee’s
amendments.240 The committee’s most important changes were to reduce the
maximum undistributed-profits tax from 42.5 percent to 7 percent, while at the
same time restoring the standard corporate income tax.241 Although business
interests would have preferred to reduce all corporate taxation as much as
possible (including eliminating the standard corporate income tax), a looming
federal budget deficit barred major reductions to tax revenue.242 A
compromise solution acceptable to business was to maintain the existing
corporate income tax, while significantly reducing the undistributed-profits
tax.243
In early June, the Senate Finance Committee’s amendments were
accepted by the wider Senate, meaning the Conference Committee was faced
with conflicting versions of the same bill.244 Following protracted
negotiations, House and Senate conferees eventually reached an elaborate
compromise. The undistributed-profits tax was set at graduated rates of 7
percent to 27 percent (based on the percentage of the corporation’s net income
239. Revenue Act, 1936: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 74th
Cong. 820 (1936) (statement of Catherine Curtis).
240. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 218.
241. Id. at 21822.
242. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 171–81. Although the
government had anticipated a balanced budget for fiscal year 1937, the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of processing taxes under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
Congress’s acceleration of World War I veterans’ bonus payments created an
unexpected deficit.
243. Id. at 213–26.
244. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 421–
25; Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 226.
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that remained undistributed in a given tax year), a range which was lower than
the House version, but higher than the Senate version.245 The standard
corporate income tax was preserved at graduated rates ranging from 8 percent
to 15 percent.246 Finally and significantly, dividends received were no longer
exempt for purposes of the individual normal tax.247 Thus, under the final
legislation enacted in late June under the Revenue Act of 1936, corporate
earnings were subject to full double taxation: profits were taxed at the
corporate level when recognized by the corporation, then taxed again at the
individual level if distributed to shareholders or again at the corporate level if
retained as undistributed profits.248
The passage of the undistributed-profits tax, even in diluted form, did
not bring an end to business’s campaign against the measure. Upon its
enactment, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement condemning
the new tax, and urged businesses to press for its repeal in the next
congressional session.249 A year later, in 1937, reversal of the burgeoning
economic recovery stoked further hostility to the tax. As the nation was finally
recovering from the Great Depression, the U.S. economy entered a severe
double-dip recession in 1937, the Dow Jones Industrial Average losing nearly
half its value between 1937 and 1938. Corporate leaders were quick to blame
the undistributed-profits tax, claiming it had shattered business confidence.250
Unsurprisingly, this argument was embraced by congressional Republicans,
but as the Roosevelt Administration failed to produce an effective response to
245. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 422–
27; Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 226–28.
246. Id.
247. The dividend exemption was removed from § 25 of the Revenue Act of
1936. See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 25, 49 Stat. 1648, 166263
(1936); see also infra Appendix row 11.
248. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936). Key
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1936 are summarized in Blakey & Blakey’s The
Federal Income Tax, supra note 29 at 424–28.
249. Text of Four Reports Adverse to the Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y, TIMES,
Jun. 20, 1936, at 6.
250. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 234–39. As a matter of
economic history, claims that the undistributed-profits tax caused the 1937 recession
are dubious. Most economists who have studied the recession have laid the blame on
reductions in federal spending and/or an ill-advised contraction of the money supply
by the Federal Reserve. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 18671960, at 493–545 (1963);
Christina Romer, The Lessons of 1937, THE ECONOMIST, June 18, 2009, at 73. In one
major study of the recession, the economist Kenneth Roose did assign the
undistributed-profits tax a contributory role, however. KENNETH ROOSE, THE
ECONOMICS OF RECESSION AND REVIVAL; AN INTERPRETATION OF 19371938, at 239
(1954).
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the economic downturn, hostility toward the tax began to spread to
conservative and then moderate Democrats as well.251 By 1938, bipartisan
dissatisfaction with the undistributed-profits tax had reached a point at which
congressional intervention seemed all but certain.252 Indeed, “in an effort to
encourage and stimulate business” and to promote “a freer flow of capital into
productive enterprises,” the Revenue Act of 1938 reduced the undistributedprofits tax to only 2.5 percent.253 The next year, the Revenue Act of 1939
allowed the tax to completely expire.254
While effectively killing the undistributed-profits tax, the Revenue
Act of 1938 did not restore the exclusion of dividends from the individual
normal tax—an incongruous outcome given the pro-investment rhetoric
surrounding the act’s passage. Why was the dividend exclusion not restored?
An important reason may be that during the political run-up to the Revenue
Act of 1938, the undistributed-profits tax was the overriding concern of
business groups, and—whether by strategy or oversight—they focused little
attention on the tax treatment of dividends paid to investors.255 After all,
corporate managers had only limited incentives to lobby for tax rules that
would primarily benefit shareholders. Another reason may be that
shareholders themselves were far less politically organized than the
management-centered business lobby. The legislative record provides
abundant evidence of the influence of business associations, but with rare
exceptions (such as the 1936 testimony of Women Investors in America),
shareholders are most notable for their absence. A final reason may be that
since the individual normal tax was only 4 percent, the issue was simply not
very salient in the context of much higher surtax rates.256 Whatever the
reasons, the result of preserving the corporate income tax without restoring the
individual dividend exclusion was that dividends paid to individual
shareholders remained subject to full double taxation. Given decades’ worth
of impassioned denouncements of double taxation by both parties in Congress,
this outcome is probably best understood as an ironic byproduct of the political

251. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16 at 234–39.
252. Id. at 234–39.
253. S. REP. NO. 75-1576, at 1 (1938). Under the Revenue Act of 1938, the
undistributed-profits tax took the form of a maximum 2.5 percentage point reduction
in the corporate income tax rate. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, §
13(c)(2)(B), 52 Stat. 447, 355 (1938); see infra Appendix row 12.
254. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862 (1939).
255. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Revenue Act
of 1938 as it relates to double taxation, see Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note
16, at 239–55.
256. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, §§ 11, 12, 52 Stat. 447,
45255 (1938).
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bargaining process. There is nothing to suggest that either Republicans or
Democrats considered double taxation a policy goal.
The irony of this result is magnified by the fact that double taxation—
a product of business lobbying—would later become the target of intense
criticism from business groups. Arguing that double taxation burdens capital
investment, business groups today, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
regularly call for its elimination.257 During the New Deal era, business groups
were willing to accept this burden if it meant avoiding the undistributed-profits
tax.258 Indeed, it was not until after the undistributed-profits tax had been
scheduled to expire that business leaders began to publically criticize double
taxation. Even then, lobbying against double taxation was a low priority for
corporate managers—especially compared to business-level tax cuts that more
directly affected the resources under their control.259
According to Steven Bank, managers’ willingness to trade double
taxation against the undistributed-profits tax is yet another example of the
agency problem well known in corporate governance scholarship.260 For the
most part, I agree with this explanation. What must be added to Bank’s
account, however, are the sweeping changes in American political economy—
the emergence of the corporation as the nation’s dominant economic
institution, the increasingly decentralized ownership of corporations by diffuse
public shareholders, and the growing political power of the national business
lobby—which in combination allowed the policy preferences of corporate
managers to triumph in Washington, even during years in which Democrats
controlled the White House and both chambers of Congress. At a more
detailed level, what must also be emphasized is that the shift from partial
double taxation to full double taxation in 1936 resulted in only a 4 percentage
point increase in the total taxation of dividends, at a time when surtax rates,
which had always been applicable to dividends, ranged as high as 75 percent.
From this perspective, the marginal difference between dividend taxation
257. For examples of business criticism of double taxation, see BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP ON THE WORLD STAGE (2011),
http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/filesFullBinder.pdf; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
Tax
Policy
(2012),
http://old.nam.org/Issues/Official-Policy-Positions/TaxTechnology-Domestic-Economic-Policy/TTDEP-01-Tax-Policy.aspx; U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Chamber Pushes Broadest Tax Relief for All (2003),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2003/may/chamber-pushes-broadest-taxrelief-all; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “State of American Business 2003” (2003),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2003/january-15.
258. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 222–23.
259. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 256–57.
260. For a more economically rigorous analysis of the agency costs
surrounding the undistributed-profits tax, see William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda,
Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and
1937, 49 J. FIN. 1727 (1994).
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before and after 1936 was simply not very significant. It was not until the
normal income tax and the surtax were consolidated into a single graduated
income tax after World War II that double taxation of dividends became a
mobilizing issue. During the 1950s, marginal rates that ranged as high as 91
percent prompted growing criticism of double taxation, leading to a number
of proposals to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes.261 High
rates also encouraged the postwar proliferation of hybrid securities—custom
investment instruments designed to provide the economic characteristics of
equity securities, while qualifying as debt securities for tax purposes and thus
allowing the deduction, as interest, of payments to investors. As corporations
sought to avoid the heavy taxation of equity capital, they became more and
more creative in the design and use of hybrid securities. Indeed, it was
precisely these practices—made possible by the law’s binary treatment of debt
and equity—that drew increasing critical attention to the debt-equity
distinction in the legal literature.262
Although the U.S. tax system continued to evolve through the postwar
era and beyond, the debt-equity distinction had become relatively fixed by the
beginning of World War II. Following the Revenue Act of 1938, interest was
fully deductible at the corporate level and fully taxable at the individual level,
while profits were fully taxable at the corporate level and taxable again when
received as dividends. Despite widespread criticism and calls for reform, this
same basic framework remains in place today.263
IV.

CONCLUSION

The history of the debt-equity distinction reveals little in the way of
forethought or design. Rather than advancing any conscious policy goal, each
major step in the distinction’s evolution was an ad hoc response to the
immediate historical context. Thus, the permanent institution of corporate
interest deductibility in 1894 was shaped by temporary economic conditions
following the panic of 1893. Similarly, the permanent repeal of the interest
261. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Heads Urge Senate to Ease Double Tax on
Dividends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1954, at 24. This criticism helped contribute to the
statutory provision of the S corporation, a type of corporation immune from entitylevel taxation (similar to a partnership), but only available to small businesses. Mirit
Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the
History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2008). Double
taxation would remain in effect for public corporations through the end of the century.
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 191–236.
262. See, e.g., Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 3; Plumb, The
Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt, supra note 3.
263. Congress has recently taken partial steps toward integration. Dividend
income (and capital gains) is today subject to a preferred rate of 23.8 percent,
compared to the maximum rate of 39.6 percent for ordinary income. See supra note 6.
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deduction limit during World War I was premised on the temporary operation
of the excess-profits tax. Finally, the rise of permanent full double taxation in
the 1930s was a byproduct of the political battle over the temporary
undistributed-profits tax. Intended to address short-term political issues, the
consequences of these decisions have outlived their historical origins.
Beyond the specific issue of the debt-equity distinction, what can this
history tell us regarding the broader development of the U.S. tax system?
Based on my research, I would propose two general insights. First, tax policy
outcomes are not the result of rational technocratic processes, but neither are
they sufficiently explained in simple terms of special-interest politics. Rather,
tax policy is often the result of reactive, context-driven decision making, by
which short-term political issues come to dictate long-term policy outcomes.
Path dependence, a common feature of institutional evolution, may be
particularly significant in the tax policy context. The economic and political
benefits of stable, predictable tax rules create a strong bias against reform—
even in situations where existing rules are merely the legacy of historical
circumstances. Robert C. Clark has written that the structure of the corporate
tax system derives from political choices made at its inception, the system’s
“major traits determined by a set of genes fixed in its infancy.”264 Clark may
overstate the point, but his argument is suggestive of the longevity of tax
policy choices.265
The second insight (in some tension with the first) is that the policy
preferences of corporate managers, as represented by the national business
lobby, have played a major role in the development of corporate tax law.
Business interests were an important factor in each of the key junctures in the
debt-equity distinction’s evolution: the decision to allow corporations to
deduct interest on debt in 1894, the relaxation and eventual repeal of the
interest deduction limit from the years 1913 through 1921, and the advent of
full double taxation of dividends in the 1930s. The national business lobby’s
increasing role in tax policy reflected broader developments in the relative
political power of corporate managers and investors. Just as the rise of interest
deductibility and the defeat of the undistributed-profits tax reflected the
political influence of corporate managers, the establishment of full double
taxation reflected the lack of influence of unorganized shareholders. Again,
however, lest the ability of managers to dictate their preferred vision of tax
264. Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L J. 90, 90–92 (1977).
265. Clark’s primary concern in “The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C” is
the growing complexity of tax law over time, a process which he argues has occurred
in a “cumulative, evolutionary way.” Id. at 92. For another account of tax law’s
increasing complexity, see Berger, Simple Interest, supra note 11. For an analysis of
the income tax’s historical development framed in the political theory of
incrementalism, see WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29.

2015]

The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction

149

policy be overstated, it should be emphasized that double taxation—a
byproduct of business opposition to the undistributed-profits tax—is today the
subject of persistent criticism from the business community itself.266 This
ironic turn of events suggests that the priorities of special interest groups may
be subject to the same short-term biases as those of legislators.
Ultimately, the history of the debt-equity distinction supports the
arguments of its present-day critics. Lacking a consistent policy basis and
shaped by ad hoc responses to shifting external pressures, it is hardly
surprising that the distinction appears arbitrary from a contemporary
perspective. The history of the distinction may also offer tangible lessons
regarding tax reform. Three such lessons spring immediately to mind: First,
major features of the tax system can (and do) emerge in the absence of
intentional policy design. Second, there is no reason to expect such features to
be optimal from any theoretical standpoint. Finally, tax policy decisions
possess significant inertia, and become difficult to reverse once made. These
lessons suggest that serious reform proposals regarding the tax treatment of
debt and equity should be based on deliberate, theoretically-informed policy
design that Congress’s past legislative decisions on the matter should be
afforded little deference, and that better tax policy may be possible if the
system were reconsidered from the ground up. Unfortunately, they also
suggest that fundamental tax reform is extraordinarily difficult, and that
smaller changes at the margin may be the only realistic course available. In the
end, from the perspective of achieving simple, elegant, and economically
efficient tax policy, the lessons of the debt-equity distinction may be less than
encouraging.

266. See supra note 257.
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APPENDIX: SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAX TREATMENT
OF CORPORATE DEBT AND EQUITY, 1861–1938
This table summarizes certain legislative developments discussed in
the accompanying article. The goal is to show major structural changes in the
taxation of corporate revenues (both at the corporate level and upon
distribution to investors). This table represents a partial summary only—many
tax law developments are not included.
DEBT
LEGISLATION

1.
1861 Act
(income tax was
enacted but not
collected)
2.
1862 Act

3.

1864 Act

4.
1894 Act
(income tax was
enacted but not
collected)
5.

1909 Act

6.

1913 Act

Tax Treatment of
Interest Paid by
Corporations

Tax Treatment of
Interest Received
by Individuals

No corporate-level
income taxation

Subject to income
tax of 3% on
income in excess
of $800
Subject to income
tax of 3% on
income exceeding
$600 (5% if the
taxpayer’s income
exceeded
$10,000).
Interest payments
subject to
corporate
withholding tax
deductible from
individual income
Subject to
graduated income
tax ranging from
5%-10%.
Interest payments
subject to
corporate
withholding tax
deductible from
individual income
Subject to income
tax of 2% on
income in excess
of $4,000

No corporate-level
income taxation.
Withholding tax of 3%
applicable to interest
paid by certain
transportation
companies

No corporate-level
income taxation.
Withholding tax of 5%
applicable to interest
paid by certain
transportation
companies

Deductible from
taxable corporate
income
Deductible from
taxable corporate
income, but only on
debt not exceeding
paid-up capital stock
Deductible from
taxable corporate
income, but only on
debt not exceeding
one-half the sum of
debt and paid-up
capital stock

EQUITY
Tax Treatment of
Tax Treatment of
Dividends
Corporate Profits
Received by
Individuals
No corporate-level
Subject to income
income taxation
tax of 3% on
income in excess
of $800
Subject to income
No corporate-level
tax of 3% on
income taxation.
income exceeding
Withholding tax of
$600 (5% if the
3% applicable to
taxpayer’s income
dividends paid by
exceeded
certain financial
$10,000).
and transportation
Dividends subject
companies
to corporate
withholding tax
deductible from
individual income
No corporate-level
income taxation.
Withholding tax of
5% applicable to
dividends paid by
certain financial
and transportation
companies

Subject to
graduated income
tax ranging from
5%-10%.
Dividends subject
to corporate
withholding tax
deductible from
individual income

Subject to
corporate-level
income tax of 2%

Excluded from
individual income
taxation

No individual
income taxation

Subject to tax of
1% on profits in
excess of $5,000

No individual
income taxation

Subject to normal
income tax of 1%
on income in
excess of $3,000.
Also subject to
graduated
additional tax
ranging from 1%6% on income in
excess of $20,000

Subject to corporate
income tax of 1%

Exempt for
purposes of the
normal income tax
Subject to
graduated
additional tax
ranging from 1%6% on income in
excess of $20,000
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7.

1916 Act

Tax Treatment of
Interest Paid by
Corporations

Tax Treatment of
Interest Received
by Individuals

Deductible from
taxable corporate
income, but only on
debt not exceeding the
sum of paid-up capital
stock and one-half of
outstanding debt

Subject to normal
income tax of 2%
on income in
excess of $3,000.
Also subject to
graduated
additional tax
ranging from 1%13% on income in
excess of $20,000
Subject to normal
income tax of 6%
on income up to
$4,000 and 12%
on income in
excess of $4,000.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 1%65% on income in
excess of $5,000
Subject to normal
income tax of 6%
on income up to
$4,000 and 8% on
income in excess
of $4,000.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 1%65% on income in
excess of $5,000
Subject to normal
income tax of 4%.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000

8.
1919 Act
(enacted February
24, 1919)

Fully deductible for
purposes of the
corporate income tax
and excess-profits tax

9.
Revenue Act
of 1921267

Fully deductible from
taxable corporate
income

10. Revenue Act
of 1935

Fully deductible from
taxable corporate
income

11. Revenue Act
of 1936

Fully deductible from
taxable corporate
income

Subject to normal
income tax of 4%.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000

[Vol. 18:3

EQUITY
Tax Treatment of
Tax Treatment of
Dividends
Corporate Profits
Received by
Individuals
Subject to corporate
Exempt for
income tax of 2%
purposes of the
normal income
tax.
Subject to
graduated
additional tax
ranging from 1%13% on income in
excess of $20,000
Exempt for
Subject to corporate
purposes of the
income tax of 12%.
normal income
Also subject to
tax.
graduated excessSubject to
profits/war-profits
graduated surtax
tax ranging from
ranging from 1%0%-80%
65% on income in
excess of $5,000

Subject to corporate
income tax of
12.5%

Exempt for
purposes of the
normal income
tax.
Subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 1%65% on income in
excess of $5,000

Subject to
graduated corporate
income tax ranging
from 12.5%15.75%268

Exempt for
purposes of the
normal income
tax.
Subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000
Subject to normal
income tax of 4%.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000

Subject to
graduated corporate
income tax ranging
from 8%-15%269

267. Pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1921, the excess-profits tax was
repealed as of January 1, 1922.
268. Corporations were allowed to deduct 90 percent of dividends received
from other corporations.
269. Corporations were allowed to deduct 85 percent of dividends received
from other corporations. Corporate profits that were not distributed to investors were
subject to a graduated undistributed-profits tax ranging from 7 percent to 27 percent.
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12. Revenue Act
of 1938
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EQUITY

Tax Treatment of
Interest Paid by
Corporations

Tax Treatment of
Interest Received
by Individuals

Tax Treatment of
Corporate Profits

Fully deductible from
taxable corporate
income

Subject to normal
income tax of 4%.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000

Corporations with
profits in excess of
$25,000 subject to
corporate income
tax of 19%270

Tax Treatment of
Dividends
Received by
Individuals
Subject to normal
income tax of 4%.
Also subject to
graduated surtax
ranging from 4%75% on income in
excess of $4,000

270. Corporations received a tax credit equal to approximately 14 percent of
dividends received from other corporations. An available dividends-paid credit (the
last vestige of the undistributed-profits tax) could reduce the corporate income tax rate
from 19 percent to 16.5 percent.

